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80 th ANNIVERSARY
This year the University of Chicago Law School celebrates its eightieth anniversary. The
Spring issue of the Law School Record looks back, with seven articles about former faculty
members from various periods of the Law School's history. It also looks forward, with an
article
The

They

eight
are,

scholars featured in the

however, examples

of the

by a young faculty member now at the

Law School.

following pages are, of necessity, an arbitrary selection.
diversity and strength of the Law School during its first
80 years.

Law School

2

building nearing completion,
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1904

loan from Harvard. James Parker Hall
brought into the fold from Stanford Law

years
was

on

where he had been

an associate
for
two
years, along with Clarke B.
professor
Whittier. Julian W. Mack and Blewitt Lee, who

School,

came

to

Chicago from Northwestern

Law

School, both had substantial law practices and
were allowed time for practice. Floyd R.
Mechem came from Michigan in 1903. Ernst
Freund was moved from the Department of
Political Science at Chicago to its Law School.

James Parker Hall
by Livingston

Hall and James Parker Hall, Jr.

When Dean Beale left

Chicago

to return to

Harvard in 1904, Dean Hall and the five other
teachers listed above faced the serious task of

organic whole out of the divergent
bequeathed to them by President
Harper's vision. During the first decade there
were added to the faculty other men who were
great in their fields. These included Harry A.
Bigelow, Frederic Woodward, Judge Edward
Hinton, and (briefly) Roscoe Pound.

creating

an

elements

October, 1904, two years after the Law
was founded, James Parker Hall, then
32 years old, became its dean. For the next 24

In

School

years he led the school

along

the

path of

greatness foreseen and prepared for by President
William Rainey Harper.
This was no easy task. Himself a Harvard Law
School graduate of the class of 1897, Dean Hall
had to meld the Harvard tradition of excellence
with the innovative ideas of Ernst Freund which
President

Harper

had

eagerly adopted.

Where Harvard taught nothing but "pure
law" in its law school, the Law School at
Chicago was to integrate into its curriculum
courses that Harvard believed belonged properly
to the departments of political science and
sociology. Upon recommendation of the first
Curriculum Committee, composed of Dean
Joseph H. Beale and the then Professors Hall
and Whittier, at Chicago courses and seminars
in administrative law, federal jurisdiction and

practice, legislation, municipal corporations,
legal ethics, and Roman and international law
could be elected in the second and third years.
Another serious difference came from the fact
that Harvard used only the "case method"
established by Langdell and Ames, while
Chicago was prepared to consider also using
lectures and the textbook method.
Finally, the new Law School would run on the
quarter system, would take students after three
years of college and permit them to count the
first year of law school as credit also for a college
degree, would admit women, and would give a
doctor's degree, the J.D., instead of Harvard's

LL.B.
To accomplish this melding of the Chicago
innovations with the Harvard standards of
overall excellence, President Harper secured for
Chicago a truly great faculty of predominantly

full-time teachers. Dean Beale

came

for two

primus inter pares, Dean Hall served the
Law School well. Roscoe Pound said of him

As
new

(3 J. Legal Educ. 529): "He devoted himself to
building up a great law school, a school of the
highest standards, vigorously maintained, and
brought the institution to a leading place among
American law schools. He

a wise
was
he
the
most
administrator.
was
Withal,
considerate of leaders, under whom and with
whom it was a pleasure to teach."
...

...

But Dean Hall did

than administer. He
taught many subjects, especially torts and
constitutional law, which he taught for 25 years.
His text on constitutional law, written in 19lO,
more

used by the LaSalle Extension University, a
correspondence school, until it closed its doors
in 1980. His casebook on constitutional law,
published in 1913, with a 1926 supplement, was
was

for many years a leader in its field. As Pound
wrote (supra), this casebook, "a model of
analysis and comprehensiveness, which held
ground for more than a generation, testified to
what he might have done ifhe had not had the
burden of administrative work to carry during
all but four of his twenty-five years as a full time
teacher of law." Thus he held his own with the
other great men on his faculty, in his own fields
of law.
made his choice to teach law
James Weber Linn,
in his column "Round about Chicago," wrote of
Dean Hall, soon after his death on March 13,
1928: "He gave up private practice, out of which
he could have made a huge income, because he
loved the law. Some years ago he declined the
presidency of Cornell University [his alma
Dean Hall

to young

early

men

and

women.
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mater, from which he graduated in 1894]
because he delighted in the teaching of law. And
his attitude toward law

always the same. He
of comparative social

school committed to the study of the "whole
field of man as a social being."

believed it to be a recorder
values and the greatest force in the world for
social reorganization."

Livingston Hall is the Roscoe Pound Professor of
Law Emeritus at Harvard Law School. James

The broadening of the Chicago curriculum to
include practical education, and to keep the Law

Parker Hall is a financial consultant and former
Treasurer of the University of Chicago. The
authors gratefully acknowledge the excellent

School in touch with the bar, brought in a
number of practicing lawyers as part-time
teachers. Dean Hall recognized this need. In
1922, he was president of the Association of

history of the founding of the Law School by
former Assistant Dean Frank L. Ellsworth, Law
on the Midway (University of Chicago Press,
1977),' and the material in the Fall 1977 issue of

American Law Schools. The Association created

the Law Alumni Journal.

the Establishment of a
Permanent Organization for the Improvement
of the Law, of which he was a member. As a
result of its report in June 1922, the American
Law Institute was founded. At the Institute's
first meeting on February 23, 1923, he was
elected a member of its Council, and served as
such until his death in 1928. The Institute
brought together for the first time lawyers,
judges, and law teachers in ajoint effort to
improve the law.
Dean Hall's heavy schedule of teaching,
administration, writing, and Law Institute work,
complicated by illness in his later years, did not
exhaust his public service. In 1918-19, as a major
in the Judge Advocate General's Department,
his knowledge of constitutional law was put at
the disposal of the Army. He was for many years
secretary of the Abraham Lincoln Social
Settlement, where he was advisor and friend to
its director, Dr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones.
a

Committee

on

A prodigious worker, Dean Hall taught
almost every summer, reserving to himself and
his family only the month of September each
year. His room at home on East Fifty-eighth
Street was filled with papers and books. On the
many Saturdays when the Council of the
American Law Institute met in New York, he
would leave Chicago by train Friday afternoon.
After the Saturday meeting, he would take the
night train to western New York, to spend
Sunday with his mother and sister in Jamestown,
and return to Chicago on the Sunday night train.
This rigorous schedule produced the ulcer which
after surgery caused his death from a cardiac
embolism.
This account of Dean Hall goes somewhat
beyond the Law School's first decade. It is
fitting, however, to note that the innovative
trends of the school's early years were
exemplified in the whole of Dean Hall's life.
President Harper and Professor Freund planned
well. Dean Beale's two years left a legacy of
promise to Dean Hall, his successor. And well
did Dean Hall administer the trust of a law

4

•

was
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Harry A. Bigelow
by Sheldon Tefft
A. Bigelow was the youngest of that
small group of young lawyers whom
President William Rainey Harper brought to
The University of Chicago early in the twentieth
century to establish its law school. When Mr.
Bigelow joined the faculty he was under 30 years
of age and had been out of law school slightly
more than four years. After a brief period as a
clerk in a Boston conveyancing office and one
semester as a part-time instructor in criminal law
at the Harvard Law School, he had moved to
Honolulu, where he spent three very active years
as ajunior member of the Bar of the Hawaiian

Harry

Islands.
In January 1904, Acting Dean Joseph H.
Beale, Jr., who was then on leave from Harvard
to

help

President

Harper organize the

new

law

school in the

West, persuaded Mr. Bigelow

abandon the

practice andjoin

the

faculty

to

at

Chicago. There he spent the remainder of his life
more than 40 years was an active
member of the Law School faculty.
The combination of an extremely acute

and for

analytical mind, unusual facility oflucid,
succinct, lively presentation, and a wide range
experience and interests! made him
exceptionally well qualified to teach. Within a

of

short time he achieved and merited the
reputation of being a most brilliant teacher. To
sit in his classes was an experience highly prized
by his students, who developed a deep affection

spite of the terrifying intellectual
frequently meted to students whose
recitations were confused or slipshod. His
reputation was enhanced by the publication of
his casebooks on The Law of Personal Property
and The Law of Rights in Land, which soon
for him in

chastisement

became standard classroom materials and
extended his influence to a large proportion of
the students in American law schools.
Though Mr. Bigelow was a superb master of
the case method, he early recognized that in
some fields it was so cumbersome and time
consuming as to be ineffective. Furthermore, his
experience indicated that investigations of legal
questions that were limited to the materials in
the law reports were often sterile. At a time when
it was fashionable to believe that textbooks in
the hands of students

were

pernicious, he

published his Introduction to the Law of Real
Property, a brief historical introduction that has
proved to be an invaluable tool for students of
the modern land law.

Bigelow realized that an effective
understanding of law frequently requires the
study of subjects that, traditionally, had been
Mr.

excluded from the law schools. Under his
leadership the curriculum of the Law School was
expanded to include subjects such as accounting,
economics, and psychology. He also encouraged
the faculty to pioneer in the development of a
program of tutorial instruction that greatly
enriched the training that the school afforded its
students.
When the American Law Institute was
organized Mr. Bigelow made distinguished
contributions to the preparation of the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, and the
Restatement of the Law of Property, of which he
was,

originally, the Reporter.

In 1929 he

Bigelow's nonprofessional interests included fields as
as art, motor cars and motoring, golf, primitive
cultures, overseas travel, and the exploration ofremote
areas. In the 1950s with his Chicago friends Herbert and
Mary Hastings Bradley, he organized two important
overland expeditions to remote sections of the Belgian
Congo which were then largely unexplored. He was a
connoisseur of African 'and Japanese art; his collection of
Japanese prints was especially noteworthy.
I

Mr.

diverse

resigned as Reporter of the Property Restatement
when the University chose him to succeed James
Parker Hall as the second dean of the Law
School. He was also then named the first John P.
Wilson Professor of Law.
In 1933 Mr. Bigelow was appointed Trustee in
Bankruptcy of Insull Utility Investments, Inc. In
the

liquidation

of that ill-fated

enterprise

his

and sound practical judgment
commanded the respect of businessmen and
lawyers alike, many of whom were surprised that
a professor could master even the most intricate
acumen

problems of that most complicated business
organization.
When Mr. Bigelow reached the University's
retirement age in 1939, he relinquished the
deanship, but, though emeritus, he continued to
teach classes in conflict oflaws, property, and
future interests for another five years.
In 1947, he was drafted by President Truman
to be a member of the National Loyalty Review
Board, and to the work of that agency he
devoted the last years of his life. One who does
not have access to the Board's files and
deliberations cannot, of course, know how
valuable to the nation were his services; but no
one who knew how preeminent were his
qualifications for the difficult and extremely
sensitive work of that agency can fail to be
thankful that, in spite of his failing health, he
had

accepted the appointment.

The service that Mr. Bigelow rendered the
nation as a member of the Loyalty Board was a
fitting climax to his career. His contributions to
his students, to the Law School to which he had
devoted 46 years, to the profession at large, and
to the nation will always inspire those of us who
were privileged to have been associated with
him.

Upon his death Mr. Bigelow left a substantial
bequest to the University, which enabled the
trustees to add a much-needed professorship to
the Law School. It is particularly appropriate
that this professorship bears his name. It serves
as a perpetual memorial to a lifetime of
distinguished teaching and scholarship that
encompassed substantially all of the first half
century of the school's existence and contributed
so brilliantly toward the realization of President
Harper's goal that the Law School of The
University of Chicago should be worthy of a
place in the great institution that he envisioned. _

Sheldon

Tefft

is James Parker Hall

Professor of

Law, Emeritus, The University of Chicago,' and
Professor of Law, Emeritus, Hastings College of
the Law, the University of California.
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administrative law. He was granted a Ph.D. in
political science from Colum bia in 1897.
In 1894, Freund began his
thirty-eight years of
association with the University of Chicago when

he

accepted an appointment to the political
faculty of the new university as

science

Ernst Freund
by Francis A. Allen
Freund is one of the great and
distinctive figures in the history of American
legal scholarship. The high regard of his
contemporaries is perhaps sufficiently suggested
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's tribute; "I don't
think I ever met anybody in the academic world
who more justly merited the characterization of
a scholar and a
gentleman than did Ernst
Freund."l A more particular recognition of
Freund's unique contribution was expressed by
an English
legal periodical at the time of his
death: "All [of Freund's] treatises have a
very
peculiar quality of their own, unlike anything
else in the whole range of English and American
legal literature. The author's Teutonic education
produced an inexhaustible industry, a
remarkable capacity for inventive classification,
and a power of subtle and penetrating

Ernst

analysis."?
Ernst Freund

was

born in New York

on

was a student at the Kreuzschule in Dresden and
the Gymnasium at Frankfort am Main, and
later attended the University of Berlin and the
University of Heidelberg. He received the degree
of J. U .D. from the last-named institution in
1884. Shortly thereafter Freund migrated to the
United States, and practiced law in New York
City from 1886 until 1894. He began his teaching
career at Columbia
College in 1892, when he
the
as
joined
faculty acting professor of

Frankfurter,

Litigation

6

compensation, public utility

and agitation for schemes of social
insurance-all became prominent features of
American life at or near the turn of the century.
This remarkable outburst of legislative
innovation brought with it judicial reaction and
restraint. Cases like Lochner v New York' and
[ves v. So. Buffalo R. CO.4 were among the most
widely discussed public events of the day.
Throughout his professional life, Freund
viewed these occurrences with interest and
concern. He brought to his
analysis an
unmatched knowledge of comparable legislative
developments in the industrialized societies of
Western Europe. He was one of the first
American scholars to give detailed attention to
the problems of achieving efficient and effective
government while preserving individual rights
.

Some Observations
and Legal Education I

Lecture, The Law
II, 1953).

2Note,

workman's

regulation,

January 30, 1864, while his German parents
were paying a brief visit to the United States. His
early education was almost wholly German. He

I

instructor of Roman law and jurisprudence. He
quickly gained an enviable reputation as a
teacher and a scholar; and when, in 1902, the
Law School of the University of
Chicago was
established, Freund was appointed to the
original faculty as professor of law. Within two
years Freund had published The Police Power,
and in the three decades that followed he
produced a steady stream of articles, books,
teaching materials, and reports, including his
best known writing: Cases on Administrative Law
(1911, 2d ed., 1928), Standards of American
Legislation (1917), Administrative Powers over
Persons and Property (1928), and Legislative
Regulation (1932). In 1929, he was appointed the
first John P. Wilson Professor of Law.
The life of Ernst Freund spans the years
between the Civil War and the New Deal.
Throughout the Western world, the forces of
change produced a new age of legislation. In the
United States, the Interstate Commerce Act of
1890 and its subsequent amendments
inaugurated an era of federal regulation and
established many of the characteristic features of
American administrative law. The Sherman Act
was only the most
conspicuous of the numerous
enactments
directed against the trusts.
legislative
laws
Factory legislation,
regulating the hours of
labor and other aspects of the labor contract,

49 Law

on Supreme Court
(The Ernst Freund
School, University of Chicago, February

Quarterly

3198 U.S. 45

Review 177

(April, 1933).

THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD

4201 N.Y.

(1905).

271,94 N.E.431 (1911).

and volition in

an

age of widespread

grasp of Continental legal systems. It
is accurate to regard Freund as one of the first
and most important American comparative-law

thorough

legislative

regulation.
All Freund's major volumes
with the new problems created

are

concerned

by legislative law
be
viewed
making. Indeed, they may
collectively
as a single work, since each of the volumes deals
with particular aspects of the larger theme. The
Police Power, published by Freund early in his
law professor, seeks to define the
constitutional scope and limits of legislative
powers of regulation. The first paragraph of his
Preface exposes the fundamental tension
between freedom and restraint inherent in all
regulative endeavors. The "police power," he
says, should be defined as the "power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property."> In
Standards of American Legislation and
Legislative Regulation, the latter published in the
final years of his life, he turned directly to the
problems of law making by legislatures and
undertook to identify the basic principles of
sound legislation and the distinctive techniques
of statutory law. But an age oflegislation is
almost inevitably an age of administration, and
Freund's pioneering works on American
administrative law are a natural expression of
his general concerns. Cases on Administrative
Law, which for more than two decades
dominated American law school instruction in
career as a

the

field," and Administrative Powers over
Property, perhaps Freund's best
known work, complete the list of his major
Persons and

to his work a high intelligence
and an erudition that have rarely been matched
in the history of American legal scholarship. It
was an erudition of many dimensions. First, it
should be noted that Freund possessed unusual
command of the various divisions of Anglo'

American law and that his knowledge
the law in its historical as well as in
its modern manifestations. Freund's interests
were by no means confined to the public-law
subjects. He wrote and taught in the law of real

encompassed

property (including wills and future interests).
His articles range

over

such diverse

areas as

domestic relations, corporations, torts,
municipal corporations, criminal law,
jurisprudence, and international law Second,
.

because of his German education and
subsequent studies, Freund possessed

Standards of American Legislation provides an
admirable introduction to Freund's work and
thought. Written originally as a series of lectures
for delivery at Johns Hopkins University in
1915, it is the most graceful and engaging of
Freund's books. It is perhaps just to say that the
Standards deals with matters of "technical"
interest, for it is concerned with problems of
social technique. But the matters are not
technical in any narrow or trivial sense of the
term. Freund is concerned with the new
problems of law making confronting the
industrialized democracies of the Western
world. These are the problems of effective
implementation of legislative policy within a
framework of values that accord high priority to
individual rights and individual freedom.
No serious examination of American

productions.
Freund brought

.

scholars. His administrative Powers over Persons
and Property bears the subtitle A Comparative
Survey,' and readers of Standards of American
Legislation will be impressed by his skillful use
of German, French, and English legislative
materials. Freund at no time made a fetish of the
comparative technique, but employed it as a
natural and necessary device for the
comprehensive consideration of the subjects he
treated.

a

'Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and
Constitutional Rights iii (1904).
6See the perceptive Comment, "Ernst Freund-Pioneer of
Administrative Law," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1962).

legislation can avoid discussion of the relations
of legislative and judicial power. This was even
more clearly true in Freund's day than it is in
ours. It is significant that the opening paragraph
of his Standards adverts to these problems. He
does not hide his conviction that many of the
then recent decisions invalidating legislative acts
on constitutional grounds were mistaken. If
Freund's position is not to be misapprehended,

however, it should be clearly understood that

although he believed that many judicial
applications of constitutional standards were
mistaken and much constitutional doctrine ill
conceived, he never challenged the legitimacy of
judicial review or doubted its necessity in the
American system.
Freund's comments

on

the relations of

legislative and judicial power lead naturally to
the primary theme of the Standards: the search
for adequate principles to guide modern

legislative law making. As has been observed, he
regarded the judicial function as vital and could
assert that "our main reliance for the

of ideals of individual liberty must
be in the continued exercise of the judicial

perpetuation
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prerogative."? But equally important is Freund's
strongly expressed conviction that constitutional
law is incapable of serving as an adequate source
of legislative principles. This theme recurs
throughout Freund's major works. It seems not
too much to say that one of his principal
scholarly objectives was the freeing of American
public law from what he conceived to be the
crippling dominance of constitutional law,'
Freund identifies

number of considerations

a

which, in his view, render constitutional law
insufficient guide for modern legislation. In
of his articles, he argues that the adversary

an

one

process in constitutional litigation is incapable
of unearthing the range of facts required for

sound judgments

on the wisdom of
legislative
measures." At other times, he emphasizes the
inevitable vagueness of constitutional standards.
Even when the legislation under attack suffers
from serious deficiencies, judicial

condemnations

expressed in the language of due
process or liberty of contract rarely expose the
vice with necessary precision. 10 Of perhaps
particular relevance

the modern reader is his
argument that because constitutional
adjudication is primarily concerned with the
limits of power, it provides poor guidance for
the wise uses of conceded power. Reliance on
constitutional standards may therefore result in
to

lesser rather than greater protections of
individual rights. "[T[he extreme of power tends
to become the norm of legislation. For

unfortunately the only utterances upon the
constitutional justice of legislation that carry
any authority are those from the courts; from
this lawyers are likely to conclude that there are

non-judicial principles applicable to
constitutional rights; and legislators (many of
whom are lawyers) seem to believe that the
principles enforced by the courts are the true and
only principles of legislation."!' On another
occasion, he wrote: "[W]e have become so
no

accustomed to rely upon written constitutions
for legislative restraint, that we have lost to a

considerable degree the habit of voluntary
restraint which is politically so much more
valuable."12 We are in danger of "confusing
what is sustainable with what is right." 13 These
points have been made frequently since Freund
wrote, and undoubtedly, had been expressed
before; but they have rarely been made as

effectively.
Ultimately, Freund concludes that valid
principles of legislation can be discovered only
by a study of legislation itself; and he visualizes
a science of jurisprudence which would make the
statutory law the object of intensive analysis and
historical investigation. "It is indeed from the
combined legislative, administrative, and
judicial experiences that we gather the problems
of legislation and their solution, but the solution
does not proceed from or rest upon judicial
authority, but must be worked out upon the
basis of a discipline hardly recognized either in
England or in this country-an independent
science of jurisprudence."
14

Freund made no secret of his dissatisfactions
with the state of legal scholarship in his time. In

the Standards he remarks:

"Unfortunately,
hardly any systematic thought has been given to
problems of jurisprudence in their constructive
aspect.

In America the critical treatment of
legislative problems is
meager and

...

technical

...

unsystematic."!' It is apparent that the
preoccupations of legal scholarship have

substantially changed since Freund's day and,
from Freund's point of view, for the better. It
would not be accurate to suggest that Freund's
influence was primarily responsible for these
changes. The logic of events made it inevitable
that the law schools could not forever confine
themselves to the elaboration and
rationalization of common-law doctrine,
as that
undertaking undoubtedly is.
But Freund foresaw the path that much modern

important

legal scholarship

'Freund, Standards of American Legislation 212-213

(1917). Herinafter cited

as

would be required to follow,
and he is entitled to recognition for his vision
and his constructive example.

•

"S.A.L."

sOne manifestation of this position was Freund's insistence
that the study of administrative law requires a focus on the
administrative process rather than on such constitutional
problems as delegation and separation of powers. See
Comment, "Ernst Freund-Pioneer of Administrative

'2Freund, "The Problem of Intelligent Legislation," 4
Proceedings of the American Political Science Association
69,77-78 (1907).

Law," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 755 (1962).

'3Id. at 78.

"Freund, "Jurisprudence and Legislation" 11-12 (Vol. VII,
Congress of Arts and Sciences, Universal Exposition, St.
Louis, 1904).
'OS.A.L. at

211-212, 220.

"Id. at 284-285.

8
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'4S.A.L. at 214.
I

'Id. at 251-252.

Francis A. Allen is the Edson R. Sunderland
Professor at the University of Michigan Law
School. He taught at the University of Chicago
Law School from 1956 to 1966. This article is
excerpted, with permission, from his Preface to
Ernst Freund's Standards of American
Legislation, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1965). ©1965 by
Chicago. A II rights reserved.

The

University of

burden of editing, introducing, annotating, and,
with his distinguished Chicago colleague
Edward Shils, translating Weber were typical of
Max. So was the splendor of the accomplishment.
In order to make the text fully intelligible and
useful, Max wrote, it had to be commented
upon. "As the readers will observe, the range of
Weber's knowledge was phenomenal.
Weber
draws upon Hindu, Chinese, Islamic or

jointly

...

primitive Polynesian law just as well as on the
legal systems of Rome, England, medieval
Europe, or modern Germany, America, or
France. In many, if not in most cases, he hints at
the phenomena referred to rather than explain
them." It was Max who did the explaining for
us. Who else could have? The
range of Max's
knowledge was equally phenomenal. And it was
available to his colleagues and students, without
the slightest diminution, until his death at age

seventy-nine.
In the preface to Max Weber on Law in
Economy and Society, Max also queried how

the
reader can know whether Weber is correct in all
those statements which he uses as the basis of his
generalizations and conclusions. "They had to
be checked and their sources had to be found
Not even Max Weber could be expected to be
infallible, but the-number of serious mistakes
turned out to be unbelievably small." Max
checked Weber. But even Max Rheinstein
cannot be expected to be infalli ble. Who will
check Max's sources? Only Max could.
The Max Rheinstein bibliography includes
some 350 titles covering his major substantive
fields-family law, decedents' estates, and the
conflicts of laws-as well as comparative law
and legal theory. The bibliography attests not
only to the universality of his knowledge and
learning about substantive law, but also to his
empiricist attitude towards legal scholarship.
The latter is perhaps best expressed in his book
Marriage Stability, Divorce and the Law (1972).
The work is concerned with how divorce law
works, or rather does not work, in industrial
societies of the twentieth century. The data are
drawn from various countries and include
almost everything of empirical importance, from
legislation and statistics to complex cultural data
not amenable to quantitative analysis.
In the world of the American law school
which precariously pursues both "is" and
"ought," Max was committed to being, in
Weber's words, a teacher, not a leader. At what
happened to universities the world over in the
wake of the sixties, he looked with bemusement.
Teaching did not, for Max, include politics. And
a splendid teacher Max was, as can be measured
by the admiration, friendship, and warmth
....

Max Rheinstein
by Gerhard Casper

Chapter
Society
data

are

Seven of Max Weber's Economy and
is entitled "Sociology of Law." Its

taken from almost

age. Its range is

anywhere and
formidable, its German

any

impenetrable at times

even for the German
reader. My first attempt to work through it
made in a deck chair on a boat from

Bremerhaven

was

to New York. I struggled for eight
arrival in New York, had to admit
defeat. A few weeks later, however, while a
student at Yale, I discovered the key to
Finnegan's Wake-an annotated American
edition of Weber's writings on the sociology of
law. In its preface the editor stated his hope to
have produced an English text "which is not
only accurate but also more readable than the
German original." This was obviously the book
I needed. It was also my first encounter with
Max Rheinstein.
In the preface, Max identified himself as
having had "the privilege of attending classes of
Max Weber's at the University of Munich."
When he undertook Max Weber on Law in
Economy and Society, Max Rheinstein was in his
fifties, a scholar of world renown. The
commitment to scholarship, and the generosity
and loyalty expressed in his shouldering the

days, but,

on
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which the generations of his former students
express. Max was not only an important
mediator for the many foreign students at the
University of Chicago Law School, but he also
transformed the teaching of foreign law to
American students into a disciplined enterprise

of

high quality and seriousness. This was
accomplished in the specialized courses of the
Foreign Law Program as well as by the
comparative perspective he provided in such
"regular" courses as Conflicts.
One of the
students and

qualities which endeared Max
colleagues was his intellectual

to

curiosity. Conversations

with Max were never
Max's
one-way.
eagerness to learn from the
student usually surpassed the student's eagerness
to learn from Max. His attitude was one of live
and let live. He was friendly to the extent of
being most reluctant to say anything critical of
personal acquaintances. As Andreas Heldrich,
of the University of Munich, recently wrote,
"When he did express some cautious skepticism
concerning a colleague, we knew that that
unfortunate fellow had no redeeming feature
whatsoever.
"

that

schooling cannot have been bad
[W]e
think, logically, autonomously and
critically. We became conscious of the Great
Tradition, acquired a sense of history and with
that, perhaps a degree of conservatism, but
conservatism of the liberal, Royal Bavarian
kind
In part, Max's humanism, zest for life,
....

learned to

"

....

and his openness to the world reflected the
vitality of his home town at the beginning of the

century.
Weber's "Science as a Vocation" concludes
with two famous sentences: "We shall set to
work and meet the 'demands of the day,' as men
as well as professionally. This, however, is
plain
and simple, if each finds and obeys the daimon
who holds the fibers of his life." Max met the
demands and found his daimon.
_

Gerhard

Casper is Dean of the Law School and
William B. Graham Professor of Law. This article
first appeared in the University of Chicago Law
Review, volume 45, number 3 (1978), and is
reprinted with permission.

Max's

scholarly curiosity and appetite for life,
shared, supported, and gently watched over by
Lilly Rheinstein, brought him to travel all over
the world. Once asked by Ken Dam what he
would have done had he not become a professor,
he said: "Oh, I would have been a travel agent."
Max filled the somewhat empty and sterile
notion of a world citizen with color and richness.
He could do so easily, because he had the one
quality which I suspect is indispensable for

cultures: Max was a patriot, or to use a
expression, "ein Lokalpatriot." The
two places where Max had his moorings were
Munich, his home town, and Chicago, the city
which had become his refuge from the Nazis.
Most of his adult years were spent at the
University of Chicago. In the best of its
traditions, he was a member of the university
community, not just the Law School. Merely by
discovering every cultural event in town and not
permitting it to take place without their
participation, Max and Lilly contributed to
making Chicago one of the great cultural centers
of the world.

bridging

German

To Munich the Rheinsteins returned every
summer-the "Royal Bavarian Capital" where
he grew up during the last decades of 750 years
of Wittelsbach rule. Looking back in a vignette
entitled Royal Bavarian, Max wrote about his
years spent in "Royal Bavarian" schools:
"Judging from what life required in later years
of change, uncertainty, demands and troubles,
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Karl N.

Llewellyn

by Allison Dunham
first encountered Karl

Llewellyn when I was a
student at Columbia Law School in
1936. In his contracts class I "volunteered" the
opinion, contrary to what I thought was his, that
when a farmer replied to a telephonic price

I first-year

quotation given by a produce house with the
will bring the produce in today,"

statement "I

did not intend to commit himself to sell to that
produce house when he arrived in town. This
opinion was based on my employment
experience in a farm produce house in South
Dakota and was contrary to some of the

he

doctrinal notes in the offer and acceptance
section of our first-year course book in

without

This was my first participation in class
discussion and my first significant confrontation'
with one of the leading exponents of legal
realism.
contracts.

Almost my last recollection of Llewellyn is his
written reaction and comment on a fictitious

examination paper I slipped into.the collection
of examination papers from his course in legal
reasoning: "He knows his Llewellyn but has not
read the materials."
The first incident described above made
lasting impact on me in seeking the legal

a

significance of almost
am

any commercial practice. I
told that the incident was probably one

selected

be the
reporter for what became Article 9 of the
Uniform Commerical Code (UCC) on Secured
Transactions, reporter alone for a few months
while I completed my teaching at Indiana
University Law School and then reporter with
the late Grant Gilmore, the co-creator of Article
9 of UCC, while I was at Columbia and Grant
reason

was

why Llewellyn

me to

at Yale.

The result described in the last incident

was

obvious, since by that time I had been exposed
student at Columbia Law
School, as a member of the board of the
Columbia Law Review, as a co-reporter for
committees of the National Conference of
Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute, and as a colleague first at Columbia
Law School and then at Chicago, a span of
almost 20 years interrupted only by World War
II. He was one of my mentors. Except for The
Bramble Bush, I have not read any of his
jurisprudential writings. Somehow my
preoccupation with land law in the area of
public law meant that after Article 9 was
completed we went our separate ways. But even
after a hiatus, many episodes from my return to
commercial law indicate the impact he had on
my legal behavior.
to

Llewellyn

as a

Shortly after llewellyn'S death, some
members of the University of Chicago Law
School faculty attended a conference at the
University of Stockholm involving the
exportability of the UCC. The other participants
legal scholars from the six or seven
Scandinavian universities. As we were taken into
the city and then out again to Vallingsby where
the conference was to be held, it was quite clear
from the glaring billboards and from the
department store windows that Swedish
"consumption" of consumer durable goods and
other consumer goods was at a high level, and
were

being

able to read Swedish I knew from

my knowledge of business practices in the
United States that the law of consumer credit

"must be"

sophisticated

and advanced.

my surprise, then, when we were told
Swedish academic colleagues that the
way Swedish retailers could obtain working

Imagine
by
only
capital
our

by placing second, third, and even
on their store buildings. This
was because, we were told, the
theory of
law
did
not
property
permit separation of
of
moveable
ownership
property from
The
possession.
Llewellyn-trained academics
knew this was not so; secured credit in inventory
was

sixth mortgages

or

accounts receivable

permitted

if the visible

consumption

had any

both had to be
signs of high-level

or

meaning.

Fortunately for us, a major Swedish Bank
with a large international department was host
to the visitors at a formal dinner in the banking
facility. After dinner it suddenly occurred to me
that my colleagues from the University of
Chicago had at the time I observed so
monopolized our hosts that each of us had
cornered a representative of the bank and
engaged him in earnest conversation.
The next

when we assembled for
looked at each other and almost
simultaneously said "they can," meaning that in
practice what was being done was to recognize
security interests in movables and intangibles
even though legal theory about
possession and
dominium dictated the opposite. I think
Llewellyn would have been proud of our skill in
reasoning from observable facts to probable
cause of the legal result. When anthropologists
doubt the validity of The Cheyenne Way as a
description of Indian law, I doubt the doubters
because I know of his amazing ability to sense
the essence of a situation from a few almost
random instances. He was right more often than
he was wrong.

breakfast,

morning,

we

My return to commercial law after an absence
of almost 30 years makes me again aware of his
influence on me, this time in narrow-issue
thinking and, I hope, in imaginative use of

precedents. Although

my present

colleagues

assert that

contractual rules about privity of
contract deny the possibility of any third party
being entitled to enforce a contract to which he
is not a party, I do not believe this is so, and I
ask them about the precedent-making
significance of a long list of statutes enabling
third parties to enforce contracts between
others. As a student of Llewellyn, I smile (since
I am a guest) at the explanation given: statute
law is not part of the common law, and the
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practices

there disclosed

aberrations,

are

apparently

though I have yet to discover a
significant commonly occurring situation of fact
in which the so-called privity rule prevents
enforcement by a stranger to the contract.
even

Agar v. Orda,

264 N.Y.

248,190 N.E. 479

(1934), which he hammered into us as the
"right" approach in sales law, if followed, would
significantly reduce the need for statutes. I
wonder whether Llewellyn would surrender in
1983 to the demand for a specific statute to solve
every particular problem that the common law
had not solved but could solve?

•

Brainerd Currie had changed the direction of the
one field-conflict of laws;' had left his
mark on significant developments in two others
law in

-civil procedure- and admiralty;' and had
documented the early efforts to recognize
another-legal education 5-along more
functional lines. Under these circumstances,
selection is necessary. I have chosen to give
prominence to Currie's work in the conflict of
laws, both because I think that his contributions
there are fundamental ones with enduring
impact, and because most of this work was done
during the eight years (1953-61) that he spent at

Chicago.
Allison Dunham is counselfor the Institute of Law
Research and Reform at the University of Alberta.
He taught at the Law School from 1951 to 1979
and is the A mold I. Shure Professor Emeritus.

Currie announced his governmental interest
for choice-of-law problems in 1958.6
Conceived during what must have been an
extraordinary period of scholarly productivity
that commenced with his year of fellowship at
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences at Palo Alto in 1957, the theory
appeared in four major articles? published in
1958, followed by three" in 1959, four more
(three with co-authors)? in 1960, two (including

analysis

2Currie's

major writings in the conflicts field are collected
Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963).

in his Selected

3E.g., Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Calif.
L. Rev. 25 (1965); Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957).
4E.g., N. Healy & B. Currie, Cases
Admiralty (1965).

and Materials

sE.g., Currie, The Materials of Law Study,
(1951); 8 id. 1 (1955).

Brainerd Currie
by Herma Hill Kay
task

to the authors

of these tributes
law professors-that of
capturing the esssence of a scholarly career in
2,000 words-is a challenging one. In Brainerd
Currie's case, it is not made less difficult by the
relative brevity of his career. In contrast to
Judith Wax's description of her long-postponed
work as a writer, entitled Starting in the Middle, 1
Brainerd Currie's work as a scholar ended in the
middle, cut short by his untimely death at the
age of 53. Yet such was the measure of his
creative intellect that in the 30 short years
between his first law teaching job at Mercer in
1935 and his death in 1965 while holding the
William R. Perkins Professorship at Duke,

The greatgiven
Chicago
to

I

Holt, Rinehart and Winston (1979).
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3 J.

on

Leg. Ed. 331

'The

following account of Currie's work is drawn from
Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34
Mercer L. Rev. 521, 538-40 (1983). It is used here with the
permission of the Mercer Law Review.
"Currie, MarriedWomen's Contracts: A Study in Conflict
of Laws Method, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 227 (1958); On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
964 (1958); Survival of A ctions: A djudication versus
Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205
(1958); The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 9

(1958).

8Currie, Notes

on

Methods and

Objectives

in the

Conflict of

Laws, 1959 Duke L. J. 171; The Constitution and the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 36,268

(1959);

The Silver Oar and All That: A

Study of the Romero

Case, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1959).

"Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A
Retraction, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 341 (1960); B. Currie & M.

Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A
Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 Duke L. J. 1; B.
Currie and H. H. Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 Yale
L. J. 1323 (1960); B. Currie & H. H. Schreter,
Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1960).

reply to an earlier critic)" in 1961, three
(including a brief comment in a symposium
discussing a leading case decided by the New
York Court of Appeals)!' in 1963, and a final
piece on the Full Faith and Credit Clause in

state had an interest in furthering the policy
embodied in its local law. This method was

a

one

subsequently modified to take account of cases
where the ostensibly conflicting interests of two
states created an apparent true conflict:
in such cases, he suggested, a "more moderate
and restrained interpretation both of the policy
and of the circumstances in which it must be
or more

1964.!2
Currie

his governmental interest
critical
denunciation of the
analysis
traditional choice-of-law rules based on
Professor Joseph Beale's vested rights theory!'
and embodied in the 1934 Restatement of

developed

as a

Conflict of Laws. Currie's major insight was that
these rules "create problems that did not exist
before,"!' and that they solve the false problems
in irrational ways, by nullifying capriciously the
interest of one state or another whose laws were
said to be in conflict without analysis of their
underlying policies. He therefore suggested that
choice-of-law rules be abandoned," and he
vigorously opposed the ongoing effort of the
American Law Institute to produce a new set of
such rules in Restatement Second."
Currie's ultimate hope was that congressional
legislation might provide a solution for truly
conflicting state interests. But, in the meantime,
he offered a method for courts faced with the
need to decide conflicts cases that would
eliminate the false conflicts by applying the law
of the only interested state, while permitting
differing outcomes in true conflicts cases
depending on where the suit was brought. His
initial suggestion was that a forum, faced with a
choice-of-Iaw problem, should investigate the
foreign law only when asked to do so by the
parties, and should apply that law only in cases
where the forum had no interest in applying its
own law't=-the "false conflict" case where only

applied to effectuate the forum's legitimate
purpose"!' might avoid the conflict. If the
conflict of policy and interest persisted,
however, the forum was faced with a "true
conflict" case and it should choose its own law
in order to advance its state's interest."
It is not

exaggeration to say that no
of significance that has occurred in
choice-of-law theory in the United States in the
25 years since Currie announced his
governmental interest analysis has failed to take
account of his views. To be sure, the scholarly
an

development

verdict has not been a harmonious one: while
some writers have taken Currie's analysis as the
starting point for their own work," others have
rejected it as a false guide to solutions they view
as unduly narrow." As I have demonstrated

elsewhere," only the

courts of two states
-California and New Jersey-continue to
proclaim their adherence to his method in the
decision of actual cases (even while, in

California's case, rejecting his suggested solution
to true conflict cases). But Currie's distinction

18Currie, The Disinterested Third State,

supra note

11,

at

757.

19Id. at 758.

2°E.g., Baade, Marriage and Divorce in A merican Conflicts
Analysis and the Restatement
(Second), 72 Colum. L. Rev. 329 (1972); Baade, Counter
Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading
Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 Texas L. Rev. 141
(1967); Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 595 (1968); Kay, The Use of Comparative
Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the
California Experience, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 577 (1980); Sedler,
The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U .C.L.A. L. Rev. 181
(1977); Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law versus Choice-of-Law
Law: Governmental-Interests

IOCurrie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 Stan.
(1961); The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr.
Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 258 (1961).
L. Rev. 719

"Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963
Duke L. 1. 1; The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. &
Contemp. Prob. 754 (1963); Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1233 (1963).
12Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly
1964

Rolefor Congress,
131.

Beale, Treatise

14Currie, Notes

on

on

Sup.

to

Judgments:

A

Ct. Rev. 89.

the Conflict of Laws

Methods and

Objectives,

(1935).
supra note

8,

at

174.

ISId. at 177.

16Currie, Comments
17Currie, Notes
177.

on

on

Babcock, supra

note

11,

at 1234-39.

Methods and Objectives, supra note 8, at

Rules: Judicial Method in
Rev. 975 (1977).

Conflicts

Torts Cases, 44 Tenn. L.

2IE.g., Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting Its Own, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 173 (1981);
Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of Law Rules, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 946 (1981); Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and
the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392 (1980);
A. Ehrenzweig, Private International Law 62-65 (1967);
von Mehren, Book Review, 171. Leg. Ed. 91 (1964); Hill,
Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to
Professor Currie, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 463 (1960).

22Kay, supra

note

6,

at 540-52.

VOLUME29/SPRING

1983

13

between true and false conflict cases has become
so widely accepted by judges that it has found its
way into courtroom applications of all the
modern approaches to choice of law. Similarly,
his emphasis on ascertaining the policy
underlying the laws said to be in conflict is a
cornerstone of modern theory and a key factor
in distinguishing modern approaches from
traditional jurisdiction-selecting approaches to
the choice-of-law problem.
Whatever other reasons may explain the
of Currie's ideas-the force of
his criticism, the keenness of his insights, and the
logic of his analysis are among those that come

enduring quality

mind-surely one important factor is the
freshness and simplicity of his writing style. A
few examples may be in order. The opening
sentence of his paper on legal education
prepared for a 1956 Symposium on Law and the
Future immediately grasped the reader's
attention:" "No man ever leaped clear-eyed
from his bed, crying 'Go to! I will write a paper
on the future of legal education,' and proceeded
to do so forthwith." And here is how he
persuasively demonstrated the lack of point in
the traditional conflicts rule that the law of the
place where a contract is made determines its
to

validity;"
a case can be stated in which
conceivable doubt as to where the
contract is made and to be performed. The
parties meet in person, accompanied by their
counsel, in the center of a stadium. The
document is read aloud. With solemn,
ceremonial flourish the document is signed,
sealed, witnessed, and delivered. The parties
shake hands. The document provides that
when payment-the only performance called
for-is due, the parties will meet again in the
same place to make and receive it. To devise
a rule which would admit the statement that
the contract was made in any other place
would challenge the ingenuity of a Lewis
Carroll. If the scene is enacted in
Massachusetts, the immanent law of that
state, which droppeth as the gentle rain from
heaven, pervades the contract, rendering it, if
it is the promise of a married woman to
answer for the debts of her husband, wet and
void. If then, as persons seeking shelter from
the rain, the parties move their solemn
charade across a state line, and act out their

I suppose

there is

no

23Currie, Law and the Future: Legal Education, 51
L. Rev. 258

24Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra

14

N w. U.

(1956).
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note

7,

at

236.

parts in

a congenially dry climate, what
possible difference can that make in terms of
anything that Massachusetts or any other
interested state may be trying to accomplish
through its laws? We may invent doctrines of
local public policy and fraud on the law, and

resort to other devices to contain the
absurdities spawned by sanctification

of the
shall see, they
contained. Why not

place of making,' but,
have not been effectively
face the fact that the place of making is quite
irrelevant,' why not summon public policy
from the reserves and place it in the front line
where it belongs?
as we

The

of expressing

complex ideas in lucid
indeed. When a slightly self
deprecating sense of humor is allowed to
enhance the text, the resulting effect is charming
-and convincing.
gift

terms is a rare one

are a scholar's contributions to the
of
the law ultimately to be measured? In
growth
Brainerd Currie's case, the significance of his

How

impact on choice-of-law theory was
acknowledged during his lifetime by

the award
of the first Coif Triennial Book Award for
outstanding legal scholarship. Presenting the
award to Currie for his Selected Essays on the
Conflict of Laws in 1965, Professor John
Dawson commented that "[h]is central ideas are
not accepted by all conflicts lawyers but it seems
clear enough that after Brainerd Currie that
dark science called the conflict of laws can never
be the same again."?' Dawson's prediction was
an apt one. The enduring influence of Currie's
work is acknowledged today by the continuing
debate he began in choice of law, as a new
generation of scholars seeks to probe and refine
his ideas, incorporating or rejecting them in their
own work. There can be no finer tribute to a
great scholar than the continued power of his
ideas to provoke thought.
•

Herma Hill

Kay '59

Professor of Law at the
University of California at Berkeley School of
is

Law.

25Ass'n Am. Law Schools 1964

Proceedings,

Pt. 2, p. 80.

Taken

together, they represent an important
chapter in his development as a First
Amendment thinker and provide a vivid glimpse
of this "legal scholar playing a gallant role as
public citizen." I can think of no better way to
convey

some sense

of the flavor of this man-his

brilliance, his wit, his sense of justice-than
taste once again these spirited essays.

Taking

Harry Kalven,

Jr.

by Hans Zeisel

to

the Fifth

In 1953 the Bulletin invited Kalven to debate
with Professor Bernard Meltzer the merits of
avoiding testimony before legislative committees
by claiming the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.'

The debate was triggered by a pronouncement
of the Association of American Universities that
he is to be remembered, too, as a legal
scholar playing a gallant role as public
citizen. Harry Kalven on Ernst Freund (40
U. Chi. L. Rev. 235 [1973])
...

Kalven will be remembered for three

Harry
major achievements. He
.

was a

distinguished teacher and author in the.field of
torts; he was among the pioneers who integrated
social science into the law; and he was a leading
scholar on the law of the First Amendment, the
topic that was closest to his heart.
only toward the end of his career that
able to concentrate his energies on the
First Amendment. A few years before his death
-in the aftermath of a heart attack-he
It

he

was

was

dropped most other activities and devoted
himself with great energy and excitement to his
magnum opus, an ambitious intellectual history
of the First Amendment tradition. The course he
taught on the First Amendment during these
years was so popular with the students that it
had to be moved to the auditorium, an event
without parallel in the school's history.
Although his reputation as a First
Amendment scholar rests primarily on his
writings about the decisions of the Warren
Court, Kalven's views on freedom of speech
were in many ways shaped
earlier-by his
in the 1950s, the time when I first
During those dark years for
free speech he wrote a number of essays in
response to various loyalty and security issues of
the day. In the main, these pieces appeared not
in law journals but in general magazines, most
often in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

experiences
came

to know him.

"[r ]efusal [to testify],

whatever

legal grounds,
profession that
claims for itself the fullest freedom to speak
on

cannot fail to reflect upon

a

"

....

Harvard had added its own voice: "The use of
the Fifth Amendment is in our view entirely
inconsistent with the candor to be expected of
one devoted to the pursuit of truth."

Professor Meltzer argues both the immorality
and the futility of claiming the Fifth
Amendment unless it is truly invoked to protect
against self-incrimination. Kalven, although not
"in direct disagreement with much Mr. Meltzer
has said," does not approve of the universities'
position. He argues that, given the gross
impropriety of the investigating methods,
claiming the Fifth Amendment as a formal
defense is not necessarily improper and no
stigma should be attached to its invocation. In
response to the Harvard statement that "we will
not shut our eyes to the inference of guilt which
the use of the Fifth Amendment creates as a
matter of common sense," Kalven drily
remarks: "It would be enlightening to learn from
the Harvard Corporation just what in its view is
the function of this part of the Fifth Amendment
in our legal system." He continues: "I endorse
fully of course the point that a faculty member
must be willing to defend his convictions at any
time in the appropriate forum; but the statement
seems to me to commita serious and dangerous
error. The refusal to cooperate with public
authority when the result of an honest belief that
the authority is acting illegally is not a lack of
candor." "Where the question is incriminating
on its face" he insists, "I do not read the law as

19 Bull. Atom. Scientists 176,181,185
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requiring anything further to support the refusal
to answer." He adds: "It is possible that the view
here suggested on behalf of the privilege comes
too late in the day. But if so, this is an occasion
for regret. This is not a particularly happy year
in which to have become hyper-critical of a part
of the Bill of Rights." Years later, in 1957,2 he
acknowledged that he might indeed have come
too late: "[T[he claim of the privilege has been
widely interpreted as raising a serious suspicion
about the witness
The privilege has thus
to
be
almost
proved
completely self-defeating.
The paradox of the privilege has become so
complete that the main fact-finding achievement
of the committees investigating subversion has
been the locating of people who claim the
privilege of not answering their questions."
....

"

...

Oppenheimer Is Denied
Security Clearance
"The Case of J. Robert
Kalven 's analysis of the
Commission's denial of security
clearance to the distinguished scientific director
of the Manhattan Project. Again it was the
Bulletin that invited Kalven's comment. 3
Next

-

I well remember how he went about this task.
For several days from early morning until late at
night he hardly left his study, reading, making

notes, and finally, as he did so often, typing the
15,000 word piece in one uninterrupted sweep.
Kalven begins with a summary of the case
against Oppenheimer: his close association with
the Communist movement prior to 1942, when
he entered government service; the 1943
"Chevalier incident," when his friend Chevalier
told him that one Eltenton had asked him about
the possibility of Oppenheimer sharing
information with the Russians. Oppenheimer
had reported Eltenton immediately to the FBI
but had delayed naming Chevalier, whom-as it
turned out correctly-he believed innocent. In
the hearing before the Commission, moreover,

Oppenheimer admitted having lied originally to
the FBI about details of his contacts with
Chevalier.
"With this much firmly in the record," Kalven
asks, "what can the fuss be about? Can it be
anything more than a close case which you or I
might have decided differently?" He then begins

2A View from the

Law-Playwright Arthur Miller on Trial,
Republic, May 27,1957.
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analysis by making

three

This

general points:

dissolves quickly
prima facie case
with
the facts.
upon further acquaintance
First, the early Communist ties are
understandable in the context of
Once he
Oppenheimer's life history
...

....

work his interests and
associations changed radically and
permanently. In brief, he appears to have
been intellectually attracted to communism
for a short intense period and then simply to
have outgrown it. Second, he is of course
Robert Oppenheimer and not John Doe,' and
has in the past twelve years achieved a record
of absolute top-level performance on behalf
of government characterized by great
dedication. Third, the early ties were never
denied by Oppenheimer and have beenfully
known for at least ten years to the
government, which has so earnestly sought
his services.
started

war

came

Oppenheimer"
Atomic Energy

New

his

(1954).
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Even General Groves, the head of the
Manhattan Project, had regarded the Chevalier
incident "as a display of the schoolboy attitude
of protecting a friend." In Kalven's view,

Oppenheimer's lying about Chevalier is "a
serious error of judgment in security matters"
and the only important item in the record that
weighs against him. But since the episode is 14
years old and has been superseded by a decade
of faithful, important service, Kalven considers
it improper to allow it to seriously impeach
Oppenheimer's character. The lie about
Chevalier, Kalven concludes, "whatever it
shows, does not show that Oppeneheimer is
liar.

a

"

He then takes on the chief legal difficulty of
the case, namely, that the commissioners had
merely exercised their broad, undefined
discretionary rights. He notes that "[i]t is in the
nature of a security risk judgment with which
one disagrees that one can never tell whether it is
the standard or the application that is at fault."
And he continues:

If the standard

is

...

,

a

prudential weighing

of evidence to determine future risk to
I find the
classified information
...

Commission

,

opinions making

a great error
their
standard.
If the
application of
standard has become more stringent so that
it was well applied here, one can only tremble
at how that standard would read if
Dr. Oppenheimer is less a
articulated
risk
security
today by any standard than he
was when he was cleared by the Commission

in the

....

in 1947. This may not be a legal defect in the
case but it is assuredly a moral defect that

be ignored. And the point bites
deeper, when it is remembered that Dr.
cannot

Oppenheimer

was

insistently sought by the
that time. It was ignoble of

government since
the government to reopen the case with no
more new data to go on than it had, and it
was twice ignoble to reach an adverse

decision on such stale matters.
I cannot get over a sense of incredulity as
I read the majority opinion
It would be
like
indeed
this were
disturbing
ifjudgments
exercised in the simple matter of whether a
man should be hired or not. It becomes
intolerable to have them made a serious part
of something so substantial as a security
hearing where career and reputation are
crucially at stake. The majority must have
known that this was not some sort of game of
....

logic they were playing. Nor were they
charged with the responsibility ofevaluating
a candidate for sainthood. They were
involved in the serious human business of
deciding whether a distinguished scientist
was by government action to be publicly
stamped as unreliable and set apart from his
fellow scientists and other men.
these words: "It is the
system and not Dr. Oppenheimer that,
the end, has lost its case."

He closes the

piece with

�ecurity
In

Kalven Is

a

bann�r headline announcing that the University
of Chicago Law School

bugs juries.

The Committee seemed anxious to show that
the
effort, which resulted in two
�ubhcatIOns, standard works in their respective
fields: The American Jury and Delay in the

major

r�se�rch

Court,

was a

Communist-inspired plot to

subvert the American jury system. Both Levi,
then dean of the Law School, and Kalven, who
had become director of the project, defended the
research episode, firmly insisting that it in no
way impeded the judicial process, that only the
untoward publicity accorded to the event could

possibly

damage.

cause

Queried extensively about his Oppenheimer

pi�c�,

Kalven

q�ietly reaffirmed:

OpInIOn at the time. It is my

"That was my
now."

opinion

He was also questioned about another
"security matter," a letter in which he had asked

President Truman to commute the death
Rosenbergs. When asked his
view of the case, he responded that he found it
puzzling on the evidence, not perhaps so
puzzling as to warrant a different verdict but

sentence of the

sufficiently puzzling

to warrant

waiving

The Case of Linus
Most of the

Pauling'

questioning in

the Committee's

done by
Sourwine.

the jury

counsel,

hearing

(

When Kalven next writes about the Internal

later, in 1955, Kalven's piece on
Oppenheimer became itself part of an
investigative record, when its author was called
to testify before the formidably titled
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration
of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee of the Judiciary
of the U.S. Senate." The occasion: at the initial
suggestion of a committee of the Kansas Bar
Association, and by arrangement with the Tenth
Federal Judicial Circuit, the Jury Project had
recorded, with consent of counsel and with the
�onsent. and control of the federal district judge,
Jury dehberations in five civil cases. More than a
year after these tapes, with an introduction by
the chief judge of the circuit, had been played in
a masked form to a select group of lawyers and
judges at the annual conference of the Tenth
Circuit, the Los Angeles Examiner burst into a

Security Committee-the occasion is the
investigation of Linus Pauling-he puts the
Committee counsel into the title of the piece:
"Sourwine in
to an

an

Old Bottle." He also treats him
the annual lampoon skit he

epigraph from

had written that year, as so many years before,
with his colleague John Hutchens for the
amusement of the

Chicago faculty.

It is

13,1955.

1st

Sess., pursuant

to

S. Res. 58, October 12 &

one

of

Kalven's many baseball stories:
COMMITTEE COUNSEL: Evidence

before this committee shows that you
gentlemen are members of an organization
known

as

the Red Schoendienst Fan Club.

WITNESSES: Yeah Red.
SENA TOR: A t last we are getting

somewhere. (To director

of research)

=Congressionat Testing of Linus Pauling (pt. I,
Cong.,

was

Mr.

Witness

A short while

484th

the

death sentence.

Framework; p. 2, Sourwine in
Atom. Scientists

an

Old

The

Bottle), 16,

Do

Legal

17 Bull.

383, 12 (1960-61).
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in very good health and vigor. Maybe it is
not serious. But it is, after all, an expression

a citation there on Red
Schoendienst?
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH: (leafing

you have

through

a

large book) Lefty Gomez, Lefty

O'Doul, Red Grange, Red Rolfe, Red

Ruffing, yes, here it is, Red Schoendienst.
On October 1,1953, the Daily Worker
carried the following item: "Red
Schoendienst is currently batting 3351"
The facts of the Pauling controversy are simple:
"Mr. Pauling furnished the Committee with
much information about his well-known
international petition against nuclear testing

including

a

list of

signers

....

He

refused,

correspondence he had
received from those he solicited, or to say how
many signatures each respondent had supplied."
however,

to turn over the

The Committee's aim was to show that the
petition was Communist inspired; the chairman,
Senator Dodd, happened to be a leading
advocate of nuclear testing. In the end Mr.
Pauling proved too much for the committee
-there

were no

As Kalven

contempt proceedings.

traces

remark that "one

the

inquiry

he is moved to

can

occasional chuckle.
The

colloquy produces one of Pauling's
the hearing:
Sourwine: The list includes the name of
Professor Hideki Yukawa of Japan. Do
next

moments at

you know him?
Oh yes, very well.

Pauling:

Sourwine: Do you know him
the Lenin prize?

Pauling:

as a

winner

He did? I didn't know that he'd

the Lenin Prize. I knew that he

won

of
won

the

Nobel Prize for physics.
But in the end it is Kalven's outrage over the
record that permeates the piece: "the
Committee's conduct verges on the fraudulent,
but it is hard to see what the purpose of the
fraud was." He concludes:

hearings seemed
wasteful, hypocritical, and offensive. I
no reason to qualify that verdict now. We

I said at the outset that the
to me
see

have noted that a thin line separates the
ludicrous from the sinister as we go through
the hearings. Undoubtedly to some the whole
enterprise will appear too inept to take
seriously, and certainly Mr. Pauling emerges

18
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power in the United States in the year 1960.
And I find it not quite sufficient comfort

that, under the existing circumstances,

we

protectedfrom the Committee's malice
only by its incompetence.

are

Victory

in the Courts

There comes then an episode in Kalven's battle
with the committees that allowed him to bring to
bear on an actual case both his legal knowledge
and his familiarity with the tools of social
science research.
In 1965 the House Un-American Activities
Committee subpoenaed the distinguished
physician Dr. Jeremiah Stamler to appear as
witness in its Chicago hearing. On the advice of
his counsel, Albert Jenner, Jr., and Thomas P.
Sullivan, Dr. Stamler refused to testify on First

grounds and asked the court for
declaratory judgment that would uphold his

Amendment

view the hearings as a
dramatic opposition of Mr. Pauling and Mr.
Sourwine and, on this view, they take on some of
the point of a morality play." Tracing the
progress ofthe mortality play, he allows us an

finest

of the official climate of opinion in the
official sense of the fair use of government

a

refusal. Kalven was a consultant on the case,
and was asked how one might demonstrate to
the court that the Committee's method of asking
questions violated both the authority vested in it
by the Congress and the constitutional rights of
the witnesses.
Kalven suggested that a content analysis be
made of the Committee's hearings, that is, a
detailed analysis of content, purpose, and
context of the questions asked and answered or
not answered, in a number of hearings that
would be randomly selected from all the
Committee's hearings. That analysis became one
of the important weapons in a court battle that
eventually ended in withdrawal of the contempt
citation against Dr. Stamler, and thereby in
victory over the Committee."
This brief essay cannot give more than a
glimpse of the measured architecture of the
pieces Kalven wrote during these years, of the

precision with which the legal argument
develops, of the respect and mastery of language
they reflect, of the sense of humor that
illuminates their serious business, and of the
magnificent anger which moved that gentle man
•
when his sense of justice was offended.

6Cf Zeisel & Stamler, The Case against HUA C-the
Evidence: A Content Analysis of the HUA C Record, 43
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 109 (1976).
Hans Zeisel is

Sociology.

Professor Emeritus of Law and

benefit

analysis

for

remedying

defective

performance by administrative agencies. The
first problem is one of definition. What does
cost-benefit analysis mean? It is sometimes
suggested that cost-benefit analysis is simply a
rough tool for weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of regulation. In this view,
President Reagan's executive order amounts to
little more than an echo of a conventional
principle of administrative law-that an

Is

Cost-Benefit
Analysis a Panacea
forAdministrative
Law?
by Cass

R. Sunstein

are

nowadays popular subjects

among all three branches of the federal
government. During the past 10 years, the courts
have often required administrative agencies to
justify their decisions by showing that the

outweigh the "costs." Congress has
expressly required cost-benefit analysis, forcing
agencies to show that the benefits of regulation
"benefits"

costs. Our last four
similar enthusiasm for
shown
have
presidents
cost-benefit principles. Most recently, President
Reagan has signed an executive order stating
that agencies may not issue expensive rules
are

of valuation-how much does one value a
certain gain in health or life? How important is it
to reduce the incidence of racial discrimination?
What price should be paid to justify the benefits
ones

administrative law and cost-benefit

Both
analysis

agency's decision must not be "arbitrary or
capricious." Cost-benefit analysis thus becomes
a means of making sure that agency decisions
are reasonable and that they do not impose costs
that are disproportionate to their benefits.
The virtue of this definition is its flexibility.
Who would object to a principle that prevents
administrators from taking action having costs
that are disproportionately high? But the virtue
of this approach is also its vice, for it renders
cost-benefit analysis almost wholly
indeterminate. The critical questions become

greater than the

unless "the potential benefits to society
outweigh the potential costs to society."
It is not hard to understand this enthusiasm
for cost-benefit analysis as a tool for improving
...

the performance of administrative agencies.
Recent studies, many of them coming from or
based on the work oflawyers and economists
from the University of Chicago, have tended to
show that regulation often reduces rather than

improves economic welfare. Indeed, agencies
sometimes impose costly regulatory
requirements that do little to help the supposed
beneficiaries. (Certain occupational safety and
health requirements are frequently given as
examples.) Cost-benefit analysis, designed to
ensure that regulation helps rather than hurts,
promises to provide a remedy for these
problems.
I want to explore here soine of the most
important questions raised by the use of cost-

gained by mandatory seat belts?
questions cannot be answered

that would be

All of these
simply. Numerical values must be used in cost
benefit analysis, and therein lies the problem.
There must be some more specific notion of how

be valued. As a result,
analysis-if it is merely a principle
of proportionality-states a truism that is apt to
be of little or perhaps no help to regulators.

costs and benefits are to

cost-benefit

critique of cost-benefit analysis-the
critique from indeterminacy-depends not at
This

all

on an argument that it is in some sense immoral
or unethical to put a price tag on such things as
life or health. That argument has undoubted
appeal, but in a world of scarce resources, there
is some limit to the amount that one would pay,

for example, to diminish the incidence of cancer
due to carcinogens in the workplace. Perhaps
regulatory decisions should not be made to
depend on an effort to maximize social wealth

question I take up-below. But no matter
what approach one takes to regulation, it will be
necessary to decide that some prices are simply
too high tobe worth paying.
Thus far I have suggested that if cost-benefit
analysis means a rough weighing of the
advantages 'and disadvantages of regulation, it is
simply too vague to be of much use for actual
decisions. But in setting forth the notion of cost
benefit analysis, economists have something in
mind other than a rough, ad hoc assessment of
advantages and disadvantages. In their view,

-a
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costs and

benefits

are

measured far

more

rigorously-by seeing how much people are
willing to pay for the item in question. To speak
in rough and general terms: The benefits of
pollution regulation, for example, would be
measured by the willingness of those subject to
pollution to pay for the regulation. Aggregate
willingness to pay would in turn be compared
with the costs of regulation, which would
include the amount those subject to regulation
would have to expend, and also the
administrative costs of the regulatory scheme.
The same would be said of regulation of race"
and sex discrimination, of broadcasting, of
safety in the workplace, and so forth. There are
of course formidable difficulties in finding out
how much people are willing to pay for these
things, but that is a practical and not a
theoretical problem.
In this light, what is one to say about efforts
by the courts and the executive branch to make
the decisions of administrative agencies depend
on application of cost-benefit analysis? One
obvious problem is that few believe that, as a
general rule, Congress

regulatory statutes
in order to promote economic efficiency. Indeed,
Professor George Stigler's Nobel Prize was
awarded in large part because of Stigler's efforts
to demonstrate that regulation is often designed
not to maximize wealth, but to redistribute it.
Laws forbidding racial discrimination and
protecting wilderness areas are not, in this view,
passes

best understood as efforts to increase the size of
the pie; they are instead designed to transfer
resources and opportunities from certain

segments of the public

making regulatory decisions on the basis of cost
benefit analysis, economically defined. (It is not,
of course, to say that decisions may not be based
on a rough balancing of advantages and
disadvantages; and it is not to deny that some
statutes can be understood as efficiency
promoting.) But what of Congress? Shouldn't

Congress design statutes so as to promote
efficiency? Some bills now pending in Congress
would amend all regulatory statutes to ensure
that regulatory action could be taken only when
the benefits outweigh the costs. Those bills
would drastically alter a number of existing
regulatory provisions, including, for example,
those that regulate cancer-causing and other
substances and hazardous conditions in the
Should those bills be enacted?
This is a large and difficult question, and I

workplace.

certain widely held public values. But
the proponents and the critics of the interest
group approach are agreed on one fundamental
thing: that as a general rule, regulatory statutes
do not, in purpose or in effect, promote

implement

efficiency.
In these

circumstances, judicial and executive
regulatory decisions on
the basis of cost-benefit analysis, economically
defined, raise serious questions of separation of
powers. The executive is supposed to execute the
laws, not to make them. If the executive decides
to implement a statute only when
branch efforts to make

is "efficient" under the
standards of economic efficiency, he will

implementation

(often)
violating the intent of Congress. If those who
passed a regulatory statute did so in order to do
be
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can

of the relevant considerations
here. First, cost-benefit analysis, economically
defined, takes the status quo-including the
existing distribution of income-for granted.
Willingness to pay is inevitably a function of
ability to pay. But regulation often should not
assume that the existing distribution is perfect;
indeed, regulation is often a referendum on the

only outline

some

current distribution.

Second, cost-benefit analysis, taken by itself,
easily square with an approach that is

to another.

Some have criticized this "interest group
theory" of the legislative process and suggested
that regulation is not about the allocation and
transfer ofresources at all. In their view,
legislation is an effort to decide upon and

W

other than promote efficiency, the
executive has no authority to decide that
regulatory decisions will be made by applying
economic principles of cost-benefit analysis. So
too with the courts, which are charged with
interpreting and applying, not rewriting, the law.
To say all this is to suggest that courts and
administrators are often prohibited from

something

does not

deeply engrained in American law-one that
understands the law as a means of protecting
entitlements rather than of maximizing utility

or

wealth. The law of tort-and the law of racial
discrimination-may be understood as
concerned not with

maximizing aggregate

welfare, but with protecting a set of
individual rights. Cost-benefit analysis may, to

economic

be sure, proceed after the initial set of
entitlements has been established; but it does not
help very much in setting that initial structure,
from which willingness to pay must be

measured.

Finally, regulation, and government activity
general, are often best regarded not as an
attempt to serve the existing set of preferences
but as an effort to reexamine them, and to decide
upon those values that ought to govern the
community as a whole. Economic cost-benefit
analysis is generally hostile to this approach. It
takes current preferences as its starting point;
in

and benefits

are calculated by seeing how
people, given whatever preferences they
may have, are willing to pay for regulation. But
regulatory activity, I submit, often operates as
an effort to scrutinize our
preferences, to see
whether what we now want-like pollution or

costs

much

discrimination-is what we should continue to
Indeed, this process of scrutiny may be
what self-government is all about.
It will be useful to conclude with a summary
of my objections to cost-benefit analysis as a
tool for regulatory decisions. To the extent that
it is defined as a rough counting of advantages
and disadvantages, it is too indeterminate to be
of much help. To the extent that it is defined in
economic terms, cost-benefit analysis often
cannot, as a matter of separation of powers, be
want.

made the basis of decision by the courts or the
president; and cost-benefit analysis,
economically defined, is usually not an attractive
basis for decision by the legislature.
All this is not to say that it is undesirable to
identify the costs and benefits, or the advantages
and disadvantages, before proceeding. Nor is it
to deny that costs and benefits should sometimes
be taken into account as a relevant consideration
in the regulatory process. But the current
enthusiasm for cost-benefit analysis should be
tempered with the understanding that it is far
from a panacea for the current problems of
administrative regulation.
_

Cass Sunstein is Assistant

Professor of Law.
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alumni PROFILE

Benjamin V. Cohen (J.D. '15)
years ago Benjamin Cohen
left his New York law practice

Fifty

Washington, where he be
member of President Frank
lin Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" and a
principal legal architect of the New
for

came a

deep

and sensitive

brilliant

idealism,

draftsman

and

was

quiet and retiring person
ality, not his public contribution.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has said of

Landis had drafted a bill that a few
weeks later became the Securities
Act. That was the start of Cohen's

Cohen: "His modest and self-effac

long

ing way of life and his preference for
doing good by stealth have not per
haps made him a household name;
but those most intimately involved
with public affairs over the last half
century recognize him as a man ex
ceptional in his intelligence, his
creativity, his selflessness, and his
superb devotion to the public weal."

reer.

Muncie, Indi
ana, in 1894. He graduated from the
University of Chicago in 1914 and
Cohen

was

born in

from the Law School in 1915. After
a

study at Harvard
(S.J.D., 1916), he be

year of further

Law School
came

secretary

Judge Julian

to

U.S. Circuit Court

W. Mack in

Chicago.

From 1917 to 1919 he was an at
torney for the wartime U.S. Ship
ping Board, and after the war, he
served as counsel to the American
Zionists at the peace conferences in
Paris and London (1919-21). The
next II years he spent in private
practice in New York City.
In the spring of 1933, with Roose
velt's proposed securities legislation
in trouble, a call went to Felix

22

THE LA W SCHOOL RECORD

and

productive Washington

Deal

Cohen

had plenty of ideas, was pre
eminently the salesman and pro
moter."? Corcoran himself, in
terviewed by the Washington Post
for an article honoring Cohen on his
seventy-fifth birthday (September
lAo M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming
of the New Deal 441 (1959).

Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics
of Upheaval 226 (1960).
2A. M.

general

istration from 1933 to 1934 and gen
eral counsel to the National Power
from

1934 to

special

assistant

Policy Commission
1941. He
to

was

also

a

U. S.

the

(1936-38),

a

attorney general
post in which he was

concerned with

public utility

hold

company litigation. However,
"Mr. Cohen's greatest contributions
were not on account of his formal or

ing

official

positions, but rather through

his intellectual influence
with whom he

was

on

all those

associated, for

mally or informally."3
During W orId War II Cohen was
instrumental in initiating the plan

legislation

Cohen and Corcoran the "Gold
Dust Twins," in reference to a popu
lar commercial jingle. Their person
alities, however, were quite dif
ferent. "Cohen was the man of ideas
and reflection; Corcoran, though he

associate

was

counsel to the Public Works Admin

ca

subsequent
-in particular, the Securities and
Exchange Act (1934), the Public
Utility Holding Company Act
(1935), and the Fair Labor Stan
dards Act (1937). The press dubbed

all
no

idea."

In the work of perfecting the se
curities bill, Cohen and Landis were
joined by Thomas G. Corcoran,
who worked closely with Cohen on

New

deposit he's left on this town,
big financial bills, you have

those

a

counselor. For all his unworldli
ness of manner, he well understood
the stock market and, indeed, had
made a good deal in the twenties,
getting out safety before the crash."l
Within three days Cohen and

of his

the

sagacious

Deal. His career of public service,
however, had begun much earlier, as
counsel to the American Zionists at
the Paris peace conference, and has
continued for half a century more. If
it has done so quietly, that is a mea
sure

24, 1969), said of Cohen: "He didn't
like to run in front, but in terms of

at Harvard. Two
days later Frankfurter brought to
Washington James Landis and Ben
jamin Cohen. "Cohen, a man of

Frankfurter, then

:

for lend lease and programs for
stabilization and
nomic

eco
war

adviser to the
American ambassador to Great
Britain in 1941, assistant to the di
rector of the Office of Economic
Stabilization in 1942-43, and general
to
the office of War
counsel
Mobilization in 1943-45. In 1944 he
was also a legal adviser to the In-

mobilization. He

was

.

Monetary Conference at
Woods, New Hampshire,

ternational
Breton

3Comment

by

Nathaniel

L.

Nathanson, Frederic P. Vose Pro
fessor Emeritus, Northwestern U ni
School of Law. Mr.
versi ty
Nathanson was an attorney with the·
Securities and Exchange Com
mission during Roosevelt's adminis
tration.

Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., a Washington
civil rights lawyer, responded:
a hundred stories of
his wisdom, but will limit myself
to one: In the 1950s, when most
people didn't know where Viet
nam was, Ben used to say to my
Wife and me that there was grave
danger of our getting involved in
that country. As our involvement
escalated, so did his advice to
stay out. I have been con

I could tell

gratulated by many people for
being one of the first to speak out
against the Vietnam war, but I
always laugh and say it couldn't
have been any other way if one
had been a disciple of Ben Cohen.

�"�
,�.

. . . .•.�.- \

"',

Arthur

Schlesinger,

has

too

com

mented: "I have often wished that I

paid more careful attention to
warnings he delivered in his
quiet manner in the early sixties
about the awful potentialities of our

President Franklin Roosevelt signing the Utility Holding Company Act, 1935.
Witnessing the signing are, left to right; Senators Alben Barkley, Burton Wheeler, and
Fred Brown; Dozier De Vane, solicitor of the Federal Power Commission;
Representative Sam Rayburn; Benjamin Cohen, general counsel to the National Power

had

Policy Commission; and Thomas Corcoran.

involvement

Cohen

active participant

the

in

Cohen

Vietnam."

has attributed the Vietnam war and
the Watergate affair at least partly

member of the American dele
gation to the Dumbarton Oaks Con
ference. Corcoran, in his 1969 in

in the

terview with the

American

delegation and then as a
delegation at sessions
from 1948 through 1952. He also
served as U.S. representative to the

broad-based administration.

member of the

President has retained the power to
make important decisions which

United Nations Disarmament Com
mission in 1952. In his book The

human events in this country and in
the world without checking in ad

built the SEC. Even now, no man in
the country understands these forces
as he does. Lend-lease was his. He

United Nations: Constitutional De
Growth, and Possi
bilities, delivered in 1961 as the Ol

vance

velopments,

and informed group of persons of
political stature and indepen

kept the civilian economy on a non
inflation basis all through the war."

iver Wendell Holmes Lectures at
Harvard University, Cohen af
firmed his belief in that body as

dence.:" Cohen

hope of peace on
earth" but also warned against its
debasement by the great powers as a
diplomatic weapon. "[T[he more af
firmative the tasks of the United
Nations may be, the greater the need
for developing a consensus of think

danger. "The Presidents, even
the greatest of them, need unbiased
judgment and moral support from
persons they can regard as their

and

a

Washington Post,

summarized Cohen's wartime con
tributions: "Ben was in substance
economic administrator during
the war; the whole structure of wage
and price controls was his work. He
our

during the war was
only with mobiliza
also with preserving an eco

Cohen's work

concerned not

tion but
nomic foundation

for

postwar

peace. It is not

surprising, therefore,
that he played an important ad
visory role in negotiations after the

war

and has devoted most of his

long

career

since then to issues of in

ternational

cooperation. He was a
counselor to the Department of
State in 1945-47 and a member of
the American delegation to the Ber
lin Conference in 1945. He attended
the Council of Foreign Ministers in
London (1945), Moscow (1945,
1947), Paris (1946), and New Y or k

City (1946) and the Paris Peace Con
ference (1946). In 1950 he appeared
before the
International Court of Justice, The
as

the U.S.

Hague.

tions,

was

an

early years of the United Na
first as a senior adviser to the

"our last

best

that will make active co-opera
possible and meaningful. In this
quest for consensus there is no role
for dogmatism and self-righteous
ness."4 It is perhaps the absence of
those qualities, as well as his wisdom
and legal astuteness, that has made

ing

tion

Cohen's one of the most respected,
if least publicized, voices in national
and international government.
Asked about his friend Cohen,

representative

4B. V. Cohen, The United Nations
10 I (1961).

to

increasing

dent, in

may

a

presi

with Roosevelt's

profoundly affect the

his view with any

"[T[he

course

of

responsible

proposed

the estab

small executive council
possible means of alleviating

lishment of
as

isolation of the

contrast

a

this

"6

peers.
It is the

country's good fortune
Benjamin Cohen brought his
wisdom, judgment, and moral sup
port to Washington in 1933 and
that

continued to exercise them on behalf
of responsible government in the
years that followed. That he has
chosen to do so out of the public eye
makes his contribution even more
remarkable.

•

'Cohen, Presidential Responsibility
and American Democracy, in The

Prospect for Presidential-Con
gressional Government 23 (1977).
6Id. at 3l.
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Publications
of the Faculty
publications described
briefly below are a selection of
recent writings by Law School
faculty members.

The

Douglas G. Baird
Bankruptcy Procedure and State
created Rights: The Lessons of Gib
bons and Marathon, 1982 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 25.

This

article

bankruptcy

looks

statutes

at

that

the two
the Su

preme Court found unconstitutional
during the 1981 term. In one of these
cases, the Court struck down all the

jurisdictional provisions
Bankruptcy Reform Act

of the
of 1978.

Mr. Baird argues that both cases can
be better understood if it is borne in
mind that

bankruptcy law, at
provides a federal forum

its

in
which the state-law claims of com
peting creditors can be adjudicated.
This view of bankruptcy law under
the difficult issues before
scores
Congress when it considers the ways
core,

in which it may

give jurisdiction to
bankruptcy judges without violating
the dictates of Article III of the Con
stitution.
Dennis W. Carlton
A

Reexamination of Delivered
Pricing Systems, 26 J. Law & Econ.
51 (1983).
Both the Federal Trade Commis
sion and the Department of Justice
have recently given attention to the
use of delivered pricing. Their con
cern is that delivered pricing can be
used to facilitate collusion. (De
livered pricing occurs when the price
a buyer is charged is not directly re
lated to the freight incurred in ship
ping to the buyer. For example, un
der uniform delivered pricing, all

buyers
less

of

pay the

same

location,

to

price, regard
receive

THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD

In

Plyer

v.

the Supreme
equal protection

Doe,

Court held that the

clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment forbids a state to charge non
resident tuition to illegal alien

schoolchildren.

Mr.

Hutchinson

argues that the decision is of

Frank H. Easterbrook
With Daniel R. Fischel: Auctions

and Sunk Costs in Tender
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

Offers,

35

Mr. Easterbrook and Mr. Fischel
continue to develop the analysis of

the legal rules governing, and eco
nomic functions of, tender offers
and defensive tactics by the targets'
managers. This article separates the
results of targets' defensive tactics as
a device for setting up an auction
(which helps the targets' share
holders, given that an offer is on the
table) from the effects of auctions on
the number of new offers (there will
be fewer as the price rises and bid
ders are unable to recover their sunk
costs of information). Easterbrook
and Fischel argue that the business
judgment rule should be interpreted
not allowing defensive tactics
as
even for the purpose of auctioneer

ing.
Richard A.

Epstein
Consequences of Com

The Social
mon

Law Rules, 95 Harv. L. Rev.

1717

(1982).

The purpose of this article was to
examine the extent to which changes
in common law rules can have large
effects upon the allocation of re
sources or the distribution of wealth
within a society. Its central con
clusion is that so long as the debate
is confined to the types of issues pre

sented to courts, the effects in both
areas are likely to be small, espe
cially when measured against the
changes that can, for good or ill, be
achieved by direct legislation. The
article ranges over a number of tra
ditional common law debates, in
cluding the choice between negli
gence and strict liability as the basic
standard of tortious responsibility,
and the role of promissory estoppel

un

value and

predictable precedential
that, as equal protection juris
prudence, it is better understood as
"substantive due process," that is, a
new-perhaps unique-substantive
constitutional right of dubious con
stitutional basis.

William M. Landes

Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust
Offenses, U. Chi. L. Rev. (1983).

Although economic analysis of
cases has been widespread

antitrust

and uncontroversial for many years,
the use of economics to examine
antitrust enforcement itself has been

largely neglected. The key concept
in applying economics to antitrust
enforcement is that of an efficient
violation-one where the gains to
the violator exceed the harm to vic
tims. An optimal sanction is one
that is sufficiently high to deter inef
ficient but not efficient violations. In
this paper Mr. Landes applies the
analysis of optimal sanctions to a
variety of issues, including the social
loss from monopoly and cartels, ef
ficient joint ventures, predatory
pricing, the desirability of victim
compensation, and the relevance of
the victim's cond uct to his ability to
recover

damages.

John H.

Langbein

With Lawrence
mation

of

Mistake:

Waggoner: Refor
the Ground of
Change of Direction in
Wills

on

American Law. 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
521

(1982).

The black letter rule of American
law is that mistakes in wills

probate

cannot be

obvious
ist
or

corrected,

no

matter how

egregious. When the typ
drops a paragraph from the will,
the lawyer hands the testator the
or

wrong instrument for

Dennis J. Hutchinson

execution, the
situation as ir
remediable. In an article co-au
thored with Professor Waggoner of
the University of Michigan Law

More Substantive Equal Protec
tion? A Note on Plyer v. Doe, 1982

that in recent

as a

supplement

to consideration in

the law of contract formation.

the

product.) This paper reexamines the
objections to delivered pricing. Eco
nomic theory is used to show how
many of the objections are un-

�

founded. The paper develops a the
ory to explain when delivered pric
ing is likely to be used collusively,
and applies the theory to several old
as well as recent cases.

Sup.

Ct. Rev. 167.

law

treats

School,

showing

Mr.

the

Langbein points

out

law the courts are
themselves increasingly discase

satisfied with the results in these
cases, but a doctrinal solution con
sistent with the formal requirements
of the Wills Act has not been found.
The two authors undertake to pro
vide a solution, based upon analogy
to the law of nonprobate transfers,
where similar defects have been ex
cused by imposing a clear-and-con

vincing evidence

standard upon the

proponents of the instrument.

permitting the practice, and identi
fies the potential problems inherent
in the practice as currently authori
zed.

Cass R. Sunstein
Public Values,
and the

1982

Equal

Private Interests,

Protection

Clause,

Sup. Ct. Rev. 127.

This essay attempts to set forth a
of the equal protec
tion clause. In so doing, it challenges
the notion that modern equal pro
tection jurisprudence is an inco
herent amalgam of conflicting pre
ferences on the part' of Supreme
Court justices. The central thesis is
that the equal protection clause is
designed to bar unprincipled dis
tributions of wealth or opportuni
ties. A distribution is unprincipled
when it is not an effort to promote a
public value, but rests on the in
trinsic desirability of treating one
person better than another. The es
say uses this understanding to ex

general theory
Bernard D. Meltzer
With S. D. Henderson: 1982

Sup

plement for

Labor Law: Cases, Ma
terials and Problems (Little, Brown
& ce., 1982).

This

supplement

covers develop
spring of 1977 to
August 1981 and updates the second
edition of Mr. Meltzer's casebook,
published in 1977.

ments

from the

Norval Morris

Madness and the Criminal Law
(University of Chicago Press, 1982).
Practiced separately, criminal law
and mental health law achieve a just
balance between freedom and au
thority, between the rights of the in
dividual and the desire of the public
to protect itself and its members.
When

mixed, however-as happens

when courts must rule on the fitness
of the mentally ill to be tried or on
their responsibility for criminal con
duct, and in sentencing the mentally
ill for crimes-confusion and cruel
ty, i nj us tice and inefficiency
predominate. Mr. Morris addresses
this question in the context of the

plain judicial
tions

on

explore

treatment of classifica

the basis of
recent

race

"busing"

and sex, to
cases, and

also to understand judicial analysis
of classifications in the area of com
mercial and business law.

The Limits of Law Enforcement
(University of Chicago Press, 1982).
The

crime
need more-and

common answer to our

is that

Mr. Zeisel concludes in this

book,

after careful investigation, that that
approach will not work. His argu
ment is based on a detailed follow
up of a probability sample of 2,000
felony arrests in New York City, in
cluding interviews with the arresting
officers, prosecutors, defense coun
sel, and judges. Zeisel maintains that
police arrest rates and court convic
tion rates cannot be significantly in
creased, nor will higher sentences
solve the problem of crime. What is
needed is a preventive strategy. The
book includes a forward by Edward
A. Levi.

Franklin E.

Zimring
Changing Legal W orId of
Adolescence (The Free Press, 1982).
The

This book is
from Mr.

significant depart
Zimring's previous

a

ure

work

in

nology.

criminal
It is

an

law

attempt

and crimi
to

explain

what others have called "children's
liberation" and "the revolution in
juvenile justice" in ordinary

nonlegal language. Moreover, he
argues that recent changes represent
the law's attempt to catch up to so
cial changes in the meaning of ado

Hans Zeisel

problem

severe-law enforcement, but

more

we

lescence over the last 50 years. The
final sections of the book try to pres
ent a coherent view of adolescence
in modern American society and
law.
•

competency of mentally ill criminals

trial, their responsibility for
crime, and the sentences to be im
posed if they are convicted of crime.
to stand

R. Stone
Television in the Courtroom, 1982
Encyclopaedia Britannica Ann.
Supplement 487.

Geoffrey

This article examines for

an essen

tially lay audience the issue of tele
vising judicial proceedings. The arti
cle traces the historical origins of the
traditional prohibition on the prac
tice, analyzes the Supreme Court de
cisions of the 1950s and 1960s hold
ing that the practice violates the due
process rights of criminal defen
dants, describes the recent trend of

Laying the

cornerstone,

May 28,1958. Viscount Kilmuir, left. Lord High Chancellor of
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Great Britain, and Earl Warren,
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memoranda
APPOINTMENTS
Robert H. Bork has been appointed
Lecturer in Law. From 1962 until
1981 Judge Bork served on the fac

ulty of the Yale Law School. At the
time of his resignation from the Yale
faculty, he was the Alexander M.
Bickel Professor of Public Law. He
left Yale in 1981 to become a part
ner in the firm of Kirkland and Ellis
and shortly thereafter was ap
pointed to the U.S. Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. From 1973 to 1977 Judge
Bork served as solicitor general of
the United States. He is a graduate
of both the College and. the Law
School of the University of Chicago
(B.A., 1948; J.D., 1953) and the au
thor of numerous articles in the
areas of constitutional and antitrust
law. His most recent book is The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War
with Itself (1978). Judge Bork will
offer a seminar on judicial review
during the autumn quarter.
Erhard Denninger has been ap

M.C.L., 1963), she was with the firm
Mayer, Brown, and Platt in Chi

of

before going into teaching.
Professor Glendon will teach a
course in family law.
Geoffrey P. Miller has been ap
pointed Assistant Professor of Law.
Mr. Miller is a 1978 graduate of Co
lumbia Law School, where he was
cago

editor-in-chief of the law review. He
received his A.B. magna cum laude
from Princeton University in 1973.
After graduating from law school,
he clerked for Judge Carl McGowan
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and for
Justice Byron R. White of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Subsequently, Mr.
Miller worked for two years for the
Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S.

Department of Justice. At present,
he is associated with the Washing
ton, D.C., law firm of Ennis, Fried
man,
terests

Bersoff, and Ewing. His. in
include administrative law,

regulation of financial in-
stitutions, and corporations.
A. W. B. Simpson has been ap
pointed Professor of Law. A gradu

courts,

of Oxford University, Professor
Simpson taught at Oxford from

ate

1955 until 1973. At Oxford he was a
Fellow of Lincoln College. In 1973
he became Professor of Law at the
University of Kent at Canterbury.
He is the author of Introduction to
the History of Land Law (1961) and
A History of the Common Law of
Contract (1975). In addition to con
tracts and legal history, his interests

pointed Visiting Professor of Law
and Thyssen Fellow for the autumn
quarter, 1983. A graduate of the
University of Mainz, he has 'been
professor of law at the Johann
Wolfgang Goethe University in
Frankfurt since 1967. He is the au
thor of many books and articles in
the areas of public law and legal the
ory, and will join Professor David
Currie in teaching a seminar in com
parative constitutional law.
Mary Ann Glendon has been ap
pointed Visiting Professor of Law
for the autumn quarter. Since 1968
she has served on the law faculty of
Boston College, and she is the au
thor of many books and articles.
Her most recent publications in
clude The New Family and the New
Property (1981) and State, Law and
Family (1977), and she is editor-in
chief of volume 4 of the Interna
tional Encyclopedia of Comparative
Law. She also serves on the Ex
ecutive Committee of the Associa
tion of American Law Schools. A
graduate of the University of Chi
cago

26

(B.A.,

1959;

J.D.,

1961;.
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Uncrating
C. Neal.

the Pevsner sculpture,

August 7, 1963.

Mrs. Antoine Pevsner and Dean Phil

include

jurisprudence and criminal
law. One of the most distinguished
British legal historians of his gener

Richard Epstein, the James Parker
Hall Professor of Law, was a com
mentator last fall at a panel discus

ation, Professor Simpson has been

a

sion

Professor at the Law School
in 1979, 1980, and 1982. He will
divide his time equally between the

ucts

Visiting

University of Kent
sity of Chicago.

and the Univer

FACULTY NOTES
Professor Dennis Carlton presented
a talk recently on the economic im
pact of the ATT divestiture at a con
ference sponsored by the Legal
Times of Washington. He also gave
seminars on "A Reexamination of
Delivered Pricing" at the University
of Chicago and on "Futures Mar
kets, Market Interrelationship, and
Industry Structure" at the annual
convention of the American Eco
nomic Association. His recent publi
cations include "The Disruptive Ef
fect of Inflation on the Organization
of Markets" (in Inflation, ed. Hall

[U niversity of Chicago Press, 1982]
and "Planning and Market Struc
ture" (in The Economics of Uncer
tainty, ed. 1. McCall [University of
Chicago Press, 1982] ).
Last fall, Professor Frank East
erbrook attended the 1982 general
meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society
as a Fellow, and also attended a
conference, at Stanford's Hoover
Institution, on the fiftieth an
niversary of the publication of Berle
and Means's Modern Corporation
and Private Property. At the latter
conference he presented, with Visit
ing Professor Daniel Fischel, a paper
on
"Voting in Corporate Law,"
which will appear, with the other pa
pers presented at the conference, in
a special issue of the Journal of Law
and Economics. In February he gave
paper at the

Legal Theory Work
of Columbia University Law
School, and in March he spoke at
the Conference Board's annual anti
trust seminar in New Y or k and pre
sented the annual Harris Lecture at
the University of Indiana at Bloom
ington. He has published several re
cent articles, including "Antitrust
and the Economics of Federalism,"
in the Journal of Law and Econom
a

shop

ics; "Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust
Law?" in the Texas Law Review;
and "Substance and Due Process,"
in the Supreme Court Review.

the time dimension in prod
liability cases, at New York
University, and participated in a
workshop on the history of work
men's compensation at the Colum
bia University Law School. In Feb
ruary he participated in a workshop
on

"A Common Law for Labor Re

on

Critique of the New Deal
Legislation" at the University of
Michigan, and a symposium on the
same topic at the Yale Law School.
lations: A

Professor R. H. Helmholz, Direc
tor of the Legal History Program,
attended the inception of the
Charles Homer Haskins Society, at
the University of Houston, Novem
ber 5-6, 1982, and gave a talk on the
early history of the grand jury.
Mark Heyrman, Clinical Fellow
and Lecturer in Law, supervised stu

dents (Charles Weisselberg '82 and
Patricia Weik
40
in

patients

'83)

who

represented
hospital
Illinois Ap

at a state mental

before the
Court.
The court vacated an
pellate
injunction entered by the Circuit
Court of Cook County, which
deprived the patients of their liberty
without a hearing.
a

case

Stefan Krieger, Staff Attorney
Fellow, has been ap
pointed by Governor Thompson to
the 17-member Task Force on Utili
ties Regulation, which is to review
public utility regulations and make
recommendations for their improve
and Clinical

ment.

An article by John Langbein, Max
Professsor of American and
Foreign Law, appeared in the Feb
ruary 1983 issue of Past and Present,
Pam

Oxford-based historical

journal.
Langbein's article, "Albion's
Fatal Flaw," is a critique of current
Marxist writing about the history of
criminal procedure. Mr. Langbein is
serving as a member of the Study
Group on Trusts of the Secretary of
State's Advisory Group on Private
an

Mr.

International Law. The group is ad
vising on American interests in a
proposed treaty on the transnational
recognition and enforcement of

private

trusts.

Associate Professor Gary Palm,
Director of the Mandel Legal Aid
Clinic, spoke on "Teaching Trial
Advocacy through the Preparation
of Actual Cases" before the Clinical

Education Section of the American
Association of Law Schools, at its
annual meeting in Cincinnati in Jan
uary. In a case handled by Mr. Palm
and his students, McCombs v. Scott,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in a case in which the Seventh
Circuit Court of

Appeals ruled that
prisoners are entitled to due process
when they are being considered for
parole by the Illinois Prisoner Re
view Board.

Professor Fazlur Rahman, a mem
ber of the Department of Near East

Languages and Civilization and
teacher at the Law School, has
published Islam and Modernity:

ern

a

Transformation of an Intellectual
(University of Chicago
Press, 1982).
Margaret Rosenheim, Dean and
Tradition

.

Helen Ross Professor of Social Wel
Policy, School of Social Service
Administration, and Lecturer in
Law, has contributed an article,
"Juvenile Justice: Organization and
fare

Process,"

the

Encyclopedia of
(ed. Sanford
Kadish [Free Press, in press] ).
Professor Geoffrey Stone testified
last fall before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in opposition to the
Reagan administration's proposed
Crime

to

and

Justice

constitutional amendment concern
ing school prayer, and an article by
Professor Stone on the same topic
appeared in the November 1982 is
sue of the Chicago Lawyer. He also
addressed the Chicago Press Club
last fall on the First Amendment
right of the press to obtain informa
tion from the government, and he
has contributed an analysis of the
First Amendment and the crime of
sedition to the forthcoming En
cyclopedia of Crime and Justice. In
April Mr. Stone gave the Cutler
Lecture on Constitutional Law at
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law
of the College of William and Mary.
Assistant Professor Cass Sunstein
spoke on the equal protection clause
to the Legal and Social Theory
Workshop at the University of
Southern California.
In October 1982, Mark Weber,
Staff Attorney and Clinical Fellow
of the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, ap

peared as a panelist in a conference
sponsored by the National Lawyer's
Guild concerning federal court liti
gation on behalf of the handi
capped.
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will be open to law stu
dents selected by the Dean of the
Law School without regard to race,

scholarships
S. K. Yee

Scholarships

University

of

Chicago

for
Law

Students

color,
gin.

sex,

creed,

or

country of ori

Dean Gerhard
generous

This fall the University of Chicago
Law School will begin awarding 20
annual scholarships of $5,000 each,
which are supported by the S. K.
Vee Scholarship Foundation
of

Hong Kong. The donor of the
funds, General S. K. Vee, is chair
man and managing director of the
United Chinese Bank of Hong
Kong, which he has headed for
than three decades. General
received financial assistance
when he was a foreign student in the
United States in the twenties. He be
lieves strongly in the moral obliga
tion of those who benefited from
scholarship aid while they were stu
dents to extend a helping hand to
current and future generations of
students. He is especially committed
to the legal profession, from which a
high proportion of the United
States' and the world's leaders de
rives and whose work should con
tribute to the advancement of justice
and the protection of liberty. The
more

Yee

first

came

Casper said of the
"As someone who
to the United States as a

gift:

foreign student,
preciative of the

I am most ap
sentiments which
have moved General Vee to support
this as well as a handful of other
American law schools. My present
responsibilities as Dean of this law
school have made me understand
even
better the contribution the
University of Chicago and other
universities have made in a non
parochial manner to the education
of American and foreign leaders. I

pleased that these scholar
ships will help ensure access to the
University of Chicago Law School
for men and women of ability who
am

very

in need of financial aid. Those of
who are responsible for private
higher education have been only too
aware that without a sense of moral
obligation on the part of former stu
dents and others we could not per
form our tasks adequately."
General Y ee, whose service with
the Chinese armed forces in W orId
are
us

The 1952-53 Law Review editorial board. Seated, left to right:
Lawrence Reich; Dale Broeder; Marvin Chirelstein; Alexander
Polikoff, editor-in-chief Standing, left to right: Howard
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War II included

helping the British
defend Hong Kong, attended uni
versities in this country as a young
man. As a beneficiary of financial
aid at that time, General Vee be
lieves that he has an obligation to re
ciprocate. Therefore,

he has estab
lished the S. K. Vee Scholarships.
Recipients of Vee scholarships, in
turn, will be asked to contribute to
the education of future law students.
Once they have become established
in their careers, they will be asked to
contribute to the Law School
amounts at least equal to those they
received.
This ann ual contribution of
$100,000 has been made at a critical
time for student financial aid. It will

help students of exceptional ability
who face both rising tuition costs
and reduced federal loan programs.
The Irving Trust Company of
New York will administer the finan
cial structure of the program, in
cluding payments to scholarship re
cipients through the Law School.
The S. K. Vee Scholarship Foun
dation has established identical pro
grams at the University 'of Califor
nia at

sity,

Berkeley, Columbia Univer
University of Michi

and the

gan.

Macl.eod, Richard Stillerman, Robert Bork, Merrill Freed,
Jean Allard. All
Review is

are members of the class
0/,53. The Law
celebrating itsfiftieth anniversary in 1983.
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George Stigler

and the

Law School

George J. Stigler, the Charles R.
Walgreen Distinguished Service
Professor Emeritus of American In
stitutions at the University, is the re
cipient of the 1982 Nobel Prize in
Economics. He has been formally
associated with the faculty of the
Law School for more than 20 years,
and his informal association dates
back even further. At present he
conducts the Workshop in Eco
nomic and Legal Organization
jointly with Professors William
Landes and Sam Peltzman.
Mr. Stigler has been a frequent
contributor to the Law School's
Journal of Law and Economics,
which dedicated a special issue (Au
gust 1976) to him in honor of his

sixty-fifth birthday.
Palmer Gives Schwartz
Memorial Lecture

Geoffrey Palmer, M.P. (l.D., 1967),
spoke at the Law School on "The
New Zealand Accident Compensa
tion Scheme: Personal Injury with
out Tort." His address, given on Oc
tober 25, was the 1982 Ulysses S.
and Marguerite S. Schwartz Memo
rial Lecture.
Mr. Palmer

was elected to the
Parliament in 1979
and is currently Deputy Leader of
the Opposition (New Zealand
Labour Party). He has practiced law
and has taught both law and politi
cal science at Victoria University in
Wellington, and also spent several

New Zealand

professor of law at the
years
University of Iowa. He has advised
governments in New Zealand, Aus
as

a

tralia, the United States, Cyprus,
and

Sri

Lanka

pensation,
on

on

and has

accident

constitutional and tort

dent

com

published books
law, acci

compensation, and social

wel

fare.

Planning

Way for
Capital Campaign

Under

Law School

-In conjunction with a University
wide effort, the Law School has be-

Visiting Committee members Kenneth Tollett '55, left, and Wulf Doser, M. C.L. '62,
right, talk with Professor Phil Neal. The Visiting Committee met on November 16-17,
1982, to observe the operation of the Law School and talk with students,faculty, and
staff. The Visiting Committee's annual report is an external source of ideas and criticism.
gun planning for a capital campaign
to raise urgently needed funds for

eludes

faculty and student support, a
30,000-square-foot addition to the
library, and four Law School pro

Sprudzs's
especially

grams: the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic,
the Law and Economics Program,
the Legal History Program, and the

Center for Studies in Criminal 1 us
tice.

The volunteer Planning Commit
for the campaign will consist of
more than 20 members. It will be
headed by Chairman Howard G.
Krane (l.D. '57) of the Chicago of
tee

fice of Kirkland and Ellis and Dep
uty Chairman Richard L. Grand
Jean (1.D. '67) of the New York of
fice of Salomon Brothers, Inc,

IILI Honors Adolf

Sprudzs

The International Journal of Legal
Information dedicated its December

1982 issue to Adolf Sprudzs, Foreign
Law Librarian and Lecturer in Le
gal Bibliography, on the occasion of
his sixtieth birthday and "in recog
nition of his achievements in the
field of national and international
law." Mr. Sprudzs is secretary of the

International Association of Law
Libraries and an associate editor of
/JLI (formerly the International
Journal of Law Libraries), the as
sociation's official publication.
The December issue of IJLI in-

an

Gerhard

introductory note by Dean
Casper describing Mr.
work at the Law School,
his development of the

Law School Library's foreign and
international law collection.

Placement
Director of Placement Paul Woo re
ported in February that, in spite of
the tight market for legal jobs,
almost all second- and third-year
students had already obtained a le
gal position. During the fall in
terview season, 420 employers came
to campus, a 4.75% increase over the

previous

year.

The summer job market for first
year students is tighter than in past
years, but Mr. Woo hopes that
changes made in first-year interview
ing procedures will help students
cope with the smaller number of

openings.
White Leaves Law School
Professor James B.

White has

re

signed from the Law School effec
tive JUly 1, 1983. He will join the
faculty of the University of Michi
gan. Mr. White, who has taught at
the Law School since 1975, is the au
thor of The Legal Imagination and
has taught courses in criminal law,
criminal procedure, legal imagina
tion, and studies in argument.
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Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir.
1982, 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1981 ).
Final oral argument in the com
petition will be heard on May 10.
The panel will consist of Chief Judge
Walter J. Cummings, Jr., of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit; Judge Richard S. Arnold, of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit; and Judge Robert H.
Bork ('53), of the U.S. Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.

Law Women's Caucus
Sponsors Talk by Darrow
The Law Women's Caucus invited
Katherine P. Darrow, general coun
sel of the New York Times Com
pany and

Milk time in Beecher Hall,former Law School residence, 1953

STUDENT NEWS
Moot Court
The four finalists in this year's Hin
ton Moot Court Competition are
William Engles, Mark D. Gerstein,
Will S. Montgomery, and Gail L.
Peek. Messrs. Gerstein and Mont
gomery and Ms. Peek

are

members

of the class of 1984, and Mr. Engles
is a candidate in a combined J.D.;
M.B.A. program and will graduate
from the Law School in 1985.
Assistant Professors Douglas G.
Baird, Diane Wood Hutchinson, and
Cass Sunstein served as the U.S. Su
preme Court to hear oral arguments
from the 12 semifinalists in the case
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World

The University of Chicago campus in 1907, looking northeast at
the corner of Ellis A venue and 59th Street. The old Law School
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a member of the Board of
Trustees of the University, to speak
at the Law School in February. Ms.
Darrow noted that First Amend
ment issues, while important, are a
much smaller part of her job than

people generally think. In fact,
much of her work concerns the busi
ness transactions of the New York
Times Company, both in this coun
try and overseas. She also described
a training
program she has estab
lished for attorneys with the com
pany's affiliated newspapers and ra
dio stations.
•

is the third building east

on

59th Street.

Chicago

alumni
NOTES

discussed "A Democrat's View of

Events

Loop Luncheon series, spon
sored by the Chicago chapter of the
The

Law School Alumni Association,
contin ues to be one of the most pop
ular alumni activities. At two lunch
eons in September, Jerry Reinsdorf,
co-owner of the White Sox, dis

the future of professional
and U.S. District Court
Marshall spoke on
Prentice
Judge
"The Myth of the Overburdened Ju

cussed

Democracy."
Women graduates

of the Law
School attended a luncheon on
April 4 at which Suzanne Kobasa,
assistant professor in the Depart
ment of Behavorial Sciences at the

University, spoke on the topic "The
Pressure of Practicing Law: Living
with Stress."

sports,

Washington Reception Honors
Dam, Bork, Scalia
On

November

10

alumni

in

the

Washington, D.C., area attended a
reception in honor of Kenneth W.
Dam, deputy secretary of state, and
Robert H. Bork and Antonin Scalia,
both judges of the U.S. Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Mr. Dam and Judge Scalia
are former faculty members of the
Law School, and Judge Bork is a
member of the class of 1953.
The reception was held at the of
fices of Michael Nussbaum '61, pres
ident of the Washington chapter of
the Law School Alumni Associa
tion.
Attending from the Law School
were
Dean Gerhard Casper, Pro
fessor Geoffrey Stone, and Assistant
Dean

Holly

Davis.

diciary."
Shadur

In January, Judge Milton
'49, of the U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, gave a talk entitled "Law

and

Society-Not

Law and Eco

January, Edward
'63, Tenth Ward

nomics." Also in
R.

Vrdolyak

alderman and chairman of the Cook
County Democratic Organization,

Robert J.

The Alumni Association sponsored
a
luncheon for Los Angeles-area
graduates on November 19 at the St.

Tropez restaurant. Cheryl Mason
'76, executive director of Public
Counsel in Los Angeles, spoke on
"Public Interest Law in a Hostile
Environment: Is Altruism Dead?"
At an alumni luncheon in New
York on December 13, Dean

Gerhard Casper

discussed "Can and
Should the Alliance between the
United States and Europe be
Saved?" The luncheon was held at
the offices of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher, and Flom.
Dean Casper hosted a reception
for graduates of the Law School at
the annual meeting of the Associa
tion of American Law Schools, held
in Cincinnati in January. Both Cin
cinnati-area alumni and alumni in

teaching

attended the

Bernard

Weissbourd

(J.D. '48), a
prominent Chicago real estate de
veloper, was elected to the Univer
sity of Chicago Board of Trustees in
February. Mr. Weissbourd, who re
ceived a B.S. in chemistry from the
University in 1941, is chairman of
Metropolitan Structures, Inc., a real

Kutak, 1932-1983

Robert 1.

Kutak, who received his
1955,
died January 23 in Minneapolis. Mr.
Kutak headed Nebraska's largest

J.D. from the Law School in

law firm and since 1977 had served
as chairman of the American Bar
Association's Special Commission
on Evaluation of Professional Stan

dards, which became known
Other Alumni Events

W eissbourd '48 New
University Trustee

Kutak Commission.
Under Mr. Kutak's

as

the

leadership,

the I3-member commission drafted
a proposed code of professional eth
ics. Commission member Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., of Yale Law School,
said of Mr. Kutak's contribution:
For the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Stan
dards Bob Kutak provided both
inspiration and enormous per
sonal efforts. The inspiration led
both to bold rethinking and, what
is

perhaps

more

difficult,

to con

trolled retreat from some more
adventurous proposals. The per
sonal efforts must have amounted
to a quarter of his time for six
years. Since Bob's "time" was
about 16 hours a day, and was
supported by the whole resources

of his firm, the gift was generous
beyond any professional com
parison
After

I have witnessed.

graduating

from the Law

School, Mr. Kutak clerked for fed-

eral

Judge Richard E. Robinson in
Omaha, and then worked for Sena
Hruska of Nebraska
from 1959 to 1965. In 1965 Mr.
Kutak established the Omaha law
firm of Kutak, Rock, and Huie,
which he built from a three-person
firm to one of the country's largest
law offices, with branches in At
lanta, Denver, and Washington. Mr.
Kutak was on the board of the Legal
Services Corporation from 1975 to
1982 and took part in numerous bar
tor Roman L.

activities in addition to his chair
manship of the Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Stan
dards.

reception.
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estate

development firm that hasun
projects in Chicago, De

dertaken

troit, Montreal, and several other
cities.
Mr. Weissbourd has taught urban
studies and has written extensively
about urban issues. He is a member
of the Central City Council of the
Urban Land Institute, a director of
the Urban Renewal Division of Ac
tion, Inc., and a former director of
the Metropolitan Housing and Plan
ning Council. He is also a director of
the Center for the Study of Demo
cratic Institutions and the Center for
Psychosocial Studies, a trustee of
Michael Reese Hospital, and a
member of the Fine Arts Music
Foundation.

Granby
County

'63 Heads San Diego
Bar Association

Earl '61 Elected Governor of
Wisconsin
On

January 3, Democrat Anthony
was inaugurated in Madison

Earl

secretary of the

S.
as

governor of Wisconsin. Mr. Earl,
who defeated Republican candidate

Terry Kohler in November,
paigned, in part, on the need

cam

for

of
in 1975 be be
came secretary of the Wisconsin De
partment of Natural Resources.
From 1969 through 1974, Mr.
Earl was affiliated with Crooks,
state

Department

Administration, and

a

state tax increase and for
programs

deal with unemployment.
Mr. Earl received his bachelor's
degree in political science from
Michigan State University and grad
uated from the Law School in 1961.
As a law student, he worked full
time for the American Bar Associa
tion.
Mr. Earl has previously held a
number of appointive and elective
offices. In 1965 he was appointed as
sistant district attorney for Mara
thon County, Wisconsin, and a year
later he was named the first full-time
to

Low, and Earl,

a six-person firm en
in general legal practice in
Wausau. Most recently he was a
partner in the Madison firm of

gaged

Foley and Lardner.
He lives in Madison with his

wife,
Sheila, and their four daughters.

city attorney

for the city of Wausau.
Elected to a state assembly seat in 'a
1969 by-election, he was reelected in
1970 to a full term and was named
to the Joint Committee on Finance.
In the following year he became ma

floor leader, a position he held
until he left the legislature in Janu

jority

ary 1975. In 1974 he

was

appointed

faced with hundreds of cases with
legal aid."
Mr. Granby is a partner in the
San Diego firm of Procopio, Cory,
Hargreaves, and Savitch, and spe
cializes in business and corporate
law and in international business
transactions. He serves on the ad
visory council of the international
division of the San Diego Chamber
of Commerce and was a member of
its Mexico Trade Mission in 1981.
He has been a delegate to the Con
ference of Delegates of the State Bar
of California since 1973, and he is
president of the San Diego chapter
of the Law School Alumni Associa
tion.
out

James J. Granby (J.D., 1963) has
been elected 1983 president of the
3,500-member San Diego County
Bar Association. Mr. Granby had
previously served as editor of Dicta,
the association's monthly magazine,
and as co-chairman of the Commit
tee on Continuing Education of the
Bar.
Asked what he thinks is the most

pressing problem facing

the local

bar, he said the reduction in legal
aid and the result it will have on the
system. "We're going to have
to assist, perhaps on a volunteer
basis, on civil cases that are in the
courts now, and the courts may be
court
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Classes of '72 and '73 Are
Subjects of Study
A

University

of

Chicago graduate
student, Marlene A. Bernstein, has

questionnaires to all members
of the classes of 1972 and 1973, as
sent

part of

a study entitled "The De
terminants of Success in the Legal
Profession." Her sample includes
graduates of three other area law
schools in addition to the University
of Chicago. All responses are both
anonymous and confidential, and
the findings of the study will be pub
licly available.

Alumni Authors
The Law School Library is eager
to receive books on any
subject
written by alumni. Any alum

nus(a) who is uncertain whether
the Law Library has a copy of his
or her book should write or call:
Ms. Judy Wright, Law Librarian,
The University of Chicago Law

Library,
cago,

1111

E. 60th St., Chi

IL 60637

(312/962-9616).

Donations of books should also
be sent to Ms. Wright's attention.

Class Notes Section – REDACTED
for issues of privacy

Barry Sullivan has become
in the Chicago firm of

ner

a

part

lenner

and Block.
W.

Jayne
Eugene

'75

R.

Barnard and
Wedoff have be-

partners in the firm of lenner

come

and Block in

Chicago.

''7L Steven Fiffer, Class Secre10 tary, 2512 N. Burling Street,
IL 60614.

Chicago,

Expecting: John and Mimi Han
cock; W. Kirk and Pamela Liddell;
Richard and Gay Lirtzman; Arthur
and Linda Sampson.
New Parents: Richard and Sharon
Nehls.
Steven

Engaged:

Fiffer

and

Sharon Sloan.
Married:
Marcia
Newly
McAllister.
On the Move: Martha Gifford is
now with the lustice Department's
Anti-Trust Division. Edward Roche,
now a professor at the University of
Denver, passed the Colorado bar
exam.

Moving Up:

Thomas

Fitzpatrick,

attorney with the Seattle firm of
Tuttle, Koch, Campbell,
Mawer, and Morrow, has been

an

Karr

,

named chairman of the American
Bar Association's Standing Com
mittee on National Conference

Groups.
Partner: David J.

and

Bradford

Donald R.
Block in

Cassling at lenner and
Chicago; James Goold at

Kirkland and Ellis in

Chicago,

Anne

Kimball at

Wildman, Harrold, Al
len, and Dixon in Chicago (named

in

1981).
In the News: Valli Benesch

subject

of the

uary 1983
zine: "At

herself to
million

cover

was

the

sportswear

company

founded by her father and mother in
It's understood
San Francisco
[she] eventually will take over as
....

was

Spanish.
Staughton Lynd was the subject of
name

into

with

now

prac-

Lindsay, Hart,

Neil and Weigler in Portland, Ore
gon. He is the co-author of "Con
flicts between State Law and the
Sherman Act," the opening article
in volume 44 of the University of
and

Barbara
band, lim

her

hus

Goering
Murray, have a daughter,
Rebecca Goering Murray, born
September 24, 1982.
Mitchell D. Goldsmith has be-

'78

Cheryl A. Chevis spoke on "Tax
Aspects of Bankruptcy and Forgive
ness of Indebtedness" at the thirty
ninth

annual

Federal Tax Course

sponsored by the Illinois Institute
for Continuing Legal Education.
Chevis

Ms.

is

an

associate with

Mayer, Brown, and Platt in Chi
cago.

Two papers written by members
of the class of 1980 when they were
students

in

Professor

John

Langbein's

English legal history
seminar have been published. "The
History of Imprisonment for Debt
and Its Relation to the Development
of Discharge in Bankruptcy," by
Jay Cohen, appeared in the Septem
ber 1982 issue of the Journal of Le
gal History (London); and Susan C.
Towne's "The Historical Origins of
Bench Trial for Serious Crime"

was

in volume 26 of the Amer

published

ican Journal

Law Review.

Pittsburgh

1I
come
a
shareholder of
Sachnoff, Weaver, and Rubenstein,
Ltd., in Chicago.
Tony Stem berger and his wife, lu
dith M. Phillips, announce the birth
of their first child, a son, Curt
Anthony Phillips Sternberger, on
October 8, 1982.
Bobbie Jo Quimby Winship has a
son, Andrew Christopher, born Sep

of Legal History.
Stang and his wife,
Cathy, have a daughter, Rebecca
Mark

A.

Rand, born December 7, 1982.

Bodansky has published a paper written for
Professor John Langbein's English
legal history seminar (see also class
of '80 above). Mr. Bodansky's "The
Abolition of the Party-Witness Dis
qualification: An Historical Survey"
appeared in volume 70, number 1, of
Joel N.

'81

the

Kentucky

Law Journal.

Charles F. Rule is now a special
assistant in the Antitrust Division of
the U.S. Department of lustice.

tember 12.
G.
Wrobel has been
vice president of the Uni
of Chicago Alumni Associa

Gregory
elected

versity

a

tion.

Luepker is the au"Qualified Retire
ment Plans: Opportunities and Ob
ligations under the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,"
which appeared in the September
October 1982 issue of the Chicago

Wayne

'79 thor

Debra

R.

of

1923

Hurwitz

Anne lessica

'80

Anna
ren

McNeal, November 4, 1982

1929
Melvin F.

Snider

has

on

1931

Edward J.

Ashcraft married Waron

Schmitt, October 10, 1983

1937

Loeb, March 1, 1983

re

August 1, 1982.

lohnson

Abrahamson, March 14,

1983

Jack W.

turned to work at Hopkins and Sut
ter in Chicago after a six-month ma
ternity leave following the birth of

Bond

Deaths

Dan H.

Bar Record.

recently
quoted on a local Spanish language
television station (channel 26) con
cerning a client matter. According
Irv is
to highly placed sources,
known to his clients as Irvingo,
there being no formal translation of
his first

Thomas Balmer is

'77 ticing

story in the Jan

Working Woman maga
31, she has committed
a career at Fritzi, the $58

top executive."
Irving Geslewitz

a New York Times profile, "Antiwar
Activist of 60's Now a Workers'
Lawyer." He practices labor law
with a legal services firm in Y oungs
town, Ohio. He has published a
handbook, Labor Law for the Rank
and Filer, and is currently publishing
The Fight against Shutdowns:
Youngstown's Steel Mill Closings.
Class members, please note: I
would like to devote the next col
umn to
a discussion of civic ac
tivities and pro bono work. Please
let me know about such work in the
comm unity or in the courts.

October 16 at

1948
Ira J.

Bergman,

November 10, 1982

1954
Edwin A.

Strugala, lanuary 31,

1983

1955

Robert J.

Kutak, lanuary 23, 1983

Chapel.

•
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The Law School Record
Invites Your Comments
The staff of the Law School Record would like to know your opinions about the magazine.
Please take a few minutes to answer the questions below, and send your completed

questionnaire

to:

Law School Record

University

of

Chicago

Law School

1111 East 60th Street

Chicago, Illinois 60637
Results of the survey will be published in a future issue.
How often would you like to receive the Record?

o Twice

a

o Three

or

year,

as now

four times

a

o One theme

year

o Several

How often do you read these features?

0 Sometimes

Always

o Never

Profiles of alumni
o

Memoranda
o

(news of the

Always

Law

0 Never

School)

0 Sometimes

0 Never

0 Sometimes

o Never

Alumni Notes

o

Always

prefer articles
o Faculty?

book reviews in the

DYes

How would you rate the appearance of the
Record?

D Attractive

D

Do you

see

D No

0 Sometimes

Always

topics

Would you like to
Record?

Feature articles

o

Do you prefer issues centered around one theme,
issues containing articles on several topics?

or

written

by:

Adequate

o Dull
o Needs

photographs

more

and

drawings

[J Other comments

o Graduates?

o Other?

_

What kinds of articles would you most like the
Record to publish? Rank the following topics in
order of preference.

o Law

practice
o Teaching of law
o Legal scholarship

Would you like to read
Law School students?

o No
Does the Record
the Law School?

you well informed about

keep

o Yes, well informed
o

Adequately

o Other

o

Inadequately

issue, which article

or

department

informed

informed

What percentage of the Record do you
read?

interested you most?

o 75%

or more

o Too short

o 25%-50%

o Too

o Less than 25%

long
good length

Do you have any other comments

usually

o 50%-75%

Articles in the Record tend to be

o A

about current

DYes

o News of the Law School

In this

more news

or

suggestions? (Please

use

back of this

questionnaire.)

THANK YOU
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